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EXCLUSIONARY ZONING: A WRONG IN
SEARCH OF A REMEDY
Leonard S. Rubinowitz*
Public policies on both the local and national level have con-
tributed to the mobility of the white and the relatively affluent
within metropolitan regions.1 Increasingly the groups benefited by
these policies have opted to move to the suburbs. At the same
time, low- and moderate-income families have generally been
unable to enjoy this opportunity for access to suburban land. 2 The
zoning ordinances and practices of suburban municipalities have
in effect acted to insure that only those who can afford to pay the
price of admission have a realistic choice of where to live.
When a suburban municipality uses the instrument of zoning to
exclude housing which is within the financial abilities of low- and
moderate-income families-a technique hereinafter referred to as
exclusionary zoning-it is invariably effective. When zoning ordi-
nances exclude apartments from a suburban area, there are, of
course, no apartments constructed. When minimum lot-size and
floor-space requirements cause the cost of a new house to soar, no
new homes of modest price are built. Thus, exclusionary zoning
operates to deny access to suburbia to many nonaffluent people.
* Research Associate, Center for Urban Affairs, Northwestern University. B.A., 1965,
University of Wisconsin; LL.B., 1968, Yale University. The author gratefully acknowl-
edges the invaluable assistance of Roger Dennis, Sarah Wolff, and Michael Romansky,
Northwestern University students, in the preparation of this article.
1 Examples of such expressions of public policy include the mortgage insurance provi-
sions of the National Housing Act, 12 U.S.C. § 1707 et seq. (1970), and home loan
benefits for veterans, 38 U.S.C. §§ 1810- 1824 (1970). These policies have provided the
means which enabled many to locate new housing in the metropolitan area.
2 Both low- and moderate-income families are defined in this article in terms of income
limits for admission to federally subsidized housing. The admission income limit is the
maximum annual income permissible in order for a family or an individual to be eligible for
admission to low-rent public housing. For example, for a family of four to be eligible for
public housing in Chicago, it must have an income below $6,000. 42 U.S.C. §§ 1408,
1410(g) (1970). Moderate-income families are defined by the income-eligibility limits of
admission to the housing programs known as Section 235 (single-family housing) and
Section 236 (multi-family housing). 12 U.S.C. §§ 1715z, 1715z-1 (1970). Generally, the
income limits for moderate-income housing are 135 percent of those for low-income or
public housing. For example, a family of four in Chicago must have an income of less than
$8,100 (135 percent of $6,000), to be eligible for the moderate-income subsidized housing
programs. Id. §§ 17 l5z(2)(h)(2), 1715z- I (i)(2).
Journal of Law Reform
The problem of the inability of persons with limited financial
means to acquire adequate housing does not end, however, with
the abolition of exclusionary tactics. When the courts hold ex-
clusionary zoning practices to be invalid and seek to include low-
and moderate-income families in a community, housing for these
previously excluded economic groups does not appear simply as a
result of a court judgment. The traditional remedies provided by
the courts do not guarantee that low- and moderate-income hous-
ing will actually be built. To date, victories for antiexclusionary
zoning forces have established important precedents but have had
a limited impact in terms of increasing the housing opportunities
available for low- and moderate-income people in communities
previously engaged in exclusionary zoning.
If traditional judicial remedies available in exclusionary zoning
cases have not succeeded in increasing the access of low- and
moderate-income families to municipalities previously engaged in
exclusionary practices, a vital question arises as to what the
courts can do to right these wrongs. Hand in hand with this
inquiry is the question of the responsibility of the courts to pro-
vide effective relief to vindicate constitutional rights. To be
effective, a remedy for exclusionary zoning must take into ac-
count the realities of the housing development process, such as
the need for multiple local approvals before construction in addi-
tion to a rezoning or variance. The nature of the available public
subsidy programs must also be considered because it is generally
not economically feasible to provide new low- and moderate-
income housing unless this is done in conjunction with subsidies.
This article discusses affirmative approaches to providing
effective relief in two types of exclusionary zoning cases: (1)
remedies specific to a particular proposed development or a given
site and (2) regional remedies, which provide a generalized frame-
work for meeting what courts are increasingly identifying as a
regional problem: the need for decent housing for all families. In
the first instance (the "single-site" case) a court would remove
obstacles in order to facilitate development of low- and moder-
ate-income housing on a particular suburban site. In the second
case (the regional approach) a court would specify the obligation
of the municipalities in a "region" in terms of the number of units
of low- and moderate-income housing to be provided in each
particular community. This obligation would be a proportionate
share of the low- and moderate-income housing needed in the
region as a whole, and would constitute the measure of relief to
which an aggrieved plaintiff would be entitled. The court would
[VOL. 6:625
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also adopt mechanisms to insure implementation of this regional
housing distribution system. Under either approach invalidation
of exclusionary zoning schemes by the courts would be converted
into the only form of effective relief, increased housing opportu-
nities in suburban areas for low- and moderate-income families.
1. HOUSING PROGRAMS AND THE
DEVELOPMENT PROCESS
If exclusionary zoning litigation is to result in actual housing
opportunities for low- and moderate-income families in suburban
areas, heavy reliance must be placed on federal housing subsidy
programs. 3 The form of these programs has changed over time,
and they are likely to continue to evolve. 4 Whatever their form,
these subsidies are critical to increasing access to suburban areas,
because these low- and moderate-income groups often cannot
afford new housing built solely by private enterprise.
The initiative in developing federally subsidized housing rests
with local public bodies as well as private sponsors and devel-
opers. The U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development
(HUD), which administers the present array of subsidy programs,
itself builds no housing. Its role is primarily reactive, i.e., funding
proposed housing projects which meet the Department's statutory
and administrative requirements and project selection criteria. 5
The oldest of the federal subsidy programs, low-rent public
housing, 6 is administered locally by a local housing authority
(LHA). The LHA initiates, develops, owns, and manages the
housing units or contracts with private parties to carry out one or
more of these functions. HUD itself does not seek the creation of
3 The other major vehicle for providing housing for this income group is mobile homes,
which have increased their share of the new housing market substantially in the last
decade. Mobile homes now constitute approximately one-fourth of the new houses pro-
duced each year.
4On January 9, 1973, the continued existence of all current subsidy programs was
placed in doubt, when outgoing U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development
(HUD) Secretary Romney announced an indefinite moratorium on funding new projects.
N.Y. Times, Jan. 9, 1973, at 1, col. I.
The future form of federal housing subsidies, if any, is not yet known. A recent
development which is likely to become increasingly important over time is the "housing
allowance." This subsidy is related to the family rather than the housing unit. Families
who cannot afford adequate housing receive subsidies which enable them to secure
standard housing of their own choice in the private market. The difference between the
market cost of the housing and the amount the family can afford to pay is subsidized by the
government.
5 See Maxwell, HUD's Project Selection Criteria-A Cure for 'Impermissible Color
Blindness'?, 48 NOTRE DAME LAW. 92 (1972).
642 U.S.C. § 1401 et seq. (1970).
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LHAs, nor does it generally require particular communities to
seek subsidy funds to develop public housing.
In the last dozen years, Congress has created an additional
array of direct subsidy programs for low- and moderate-income
people. These programs depend on private sponsors for initiative,
unlike the public housing program, which relies on local govern-
ment. In 1961 Congress enacted the Section 221(d)(3) program. 7
Under this program, new apartments were constructed for moder-
ate-income families, who had been priced out of the new housing
market. Rents for these apartments were federally subsidized.
The rent supplement program, which followed in 1965, has pro-
portionately greater subsidies and serves low-income families
(much like public housing) in accomodations which are privately
developed and owned
Finally, the omnibus Housing and Urban Development Act of
1968 created the Section 235 program, which assists moder-
ate-income families in attaining home ownership. The 1968 Act
also initiated the Section 236 program (successor to the Section
22 1 (d)(3) program), which subsidizes rental housing for the same
income group.9 Under both of these programs, an eligible sponsor
applies to HUD for subsidies which reduce the cost to the occu-
pant, thus bringing adequate housing within the range of low- and
moderate-income families.
In addition to weaving his way through the federal adminis-
trative maze associated with these programs, a public or a private
developer of subsidized housing must secure a number of approv-
als at the local level before starting construction. Obtaining de-
sired zoning may be a major hurdle. Often, it is necessary to seek
separate permission to tap into the municipal sewer system. A
developer must also obtain a building permit, which involves
demonstrating that the building plans conform to the requirements
of the local building code. If a municipality desires to exclude
low- and moderate-income housing, all of these apparently neutral
administrative devices are at its command. In addition, the suburb
seeking to exclude people with limited incomes has a frequent,
and not altogether unconscious, ally in the Congress. The federal
subsidy programs include constraints which, directly or indirectly,
permit the local community to prohibit the use of the program
within its borders. Of the four major subsidy programs, the local
7 12 U.S.C. § 17151 (1970).
8 Id. § 170Is.
9 1d. §§ 1715z, 1715z-1.
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governing body has a direct veto power in two (public housing
and rent supplement) and indirect "assistance" in this endeavor
from the Congress in the other two (Sections 235 and 236).
When the rent supplement program was enacted, HUD consid-
ered using this program as a means of providing integrated hous-
ing opportunities in the suburbs. When Congress was informed of
these plans, it approved only a small appropriation and placed a
condition on the use of these funds, prohibiting their use in any
community without the express approval of the local governing
body.' 0 Inaction by the community is thus sufficient to exclude
rent supplement units.
Failure of local government to act may also serve to keep
low-rent public housing out of a community. This local veto may
take the form of failing to create a local housing authority to
administer the program. Even if a housing authority exists which
has jurisdiction over a particular suburb, the housing authority
cannot operate within the boundaries of any municipality without
the consent of the local governing body. Generally, that approval
takes the form of a cooperation agreement between the local
government and the independent housing authority."
Thus, Congress has clearly made the low-income housing pro-
grams a matter of local option. A similar result is achieved with
the moderate-income programs by means of the cost ceilings
written into the law. Section 235 and Section 236 units may not
exceed approximately $24,000 in total development cost. 12
Through the use of any number of zoning devices a suburb can
effectively exclude this housing. Although federal subsidy pro-
grams are an imperfect vehicle for relief in exclusionary zoning
cases, the absence of subsidy funds would present a far greater
roadblock to providing realistic remedies.' 3
10 An appropriation of $30 million was originally requested for this program. Congress
reduced that to $12 million and attached the limiting rider. See Welfeld, Rent Supplements
and the Subsidy Dilemma, 32 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 465, 470-71 (1967). The local
veto power also enables the community to prevent development of mixed-income projects,
which could otherwise be created by "piggy-backing" the rent supplement subsidy onto a
portion of the units in a Section 236 development.
1142 U.S.C. § 1415(7)(a)(i) (1970). The locality agrees to provide municipal services
and to accept 10 percent of shelter rents as a payment in lieu of taxes. Local governing
bodies have generally refused to sign such agreements for projects in nonslum areas, in
central cities, and in suburbs.
12 12 U.S.C. §§ 17 15z(i)(3)(B), 17 15z- I(i)(3)(1970).
13 In addition to the extraordinary impoundment of appropriated funds, announced by
the federal government in January, 1973, these programs are subject to the annual uncer-
tainties of the congressional appropriation process. Each of the existing programs is
politically controversial in part because of efforts to use the programs in suburban areas.
Even if the moratorium on spending is eventually lifted, there is no assurance of continued
congressional appropriations for the programs.
SPRING 1973]
Journal of Law Reform
I1. EQUITABLE RELIEF IN CONSTITUTIONAL CASES
Assuming that federal subsidy programs continue to exist in
some form, the courts will continue to have the potential to
provide effective relief in the form of actual housing opportunities
in exclusionary zoning cases. 14 Indeed, they have a responsibility
to do so when local zoning practices are held unconstitutional.
This obligation is based on the principle that courts of equity have
a duty to provide effective relief, once a constitutional violation is
found.' 5 A substantial portion of the judicial review of local zon-
ing which has occurred in both federal and state courts is, in fact,
couched in constitutional terms.
A. Recent Zoning Cases in Federal Courts
Finding Constitutional Violations
Several recent federal court decisions have explicitly held that
local zoning actions violated constitutional norms. In Kennedy
Park Homes Association v. City of Lackawanna,'6 a United
States court of appeals affirmed a district court holding that
refusal by the city to permit the development of a low-income
subdivision in an all-white area was illegal. The plaintiffs' claims
were based on both constitutional (fourteenth amendment) and
statutory grounds (Fair Housing Act of 196817). Neither the dis-
trict court nor the court of appeals distinguished between the legal
theories presented. Rather, the courts treated these arguments as
basically coextensive. The United States Court of Appeals for the
Tenth Circuit upheld a similar finding of unconstitutionality in
14Assuming no federal subsidies and the continuation of the present economics of
housing, the courts' remedial powers would realistically be limited to permitting the
inclusion of mobile homes in suburban areas.
15 The jurisdiction of an equity court is triggered by the constitutional claims at stake. It
is well established that equity courts will entertain jurisdiction in cases where con-
stitutional attacks are made. See, e.g., Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402
U.S. 1, 15. 16(1971).
16318 F. Supp. 669 (W.D.N.Y. 1969), aff d, 436 F.2d 108 (2d Cir. 1970), cert. denied,
401 U.S. 1010 (197 1). In Lackawanna, the vast majority of the city's black population
lived in substandard housing in the first ward. Two other wards were essentially white and
characterized by a better housing and living environment. In response to community
opposition to a project in one of the white wards, the city council, in 1968, rezoned the
area of the proposed project for park and recreational purposes. The council also imposed
an indefinite moratorium on further approval of subdivisions. After the developer sued and
the federal government intervened, the council rescinded the rezoning and the moratorium.
The mayor later refused, however, to approve an extension of the sewage system neces-
sary for the proposed subdivision.
Based on the specific facts revealed at trial, the district court found that the actions of
the city officials were in response to the discriminatory attitudes of the community, which
sought to continue the confinement of the city's low-income blacks to the first ward. The
Court of Appeals affirmed this particular finding. 436 F.2d at 109.
1742 U.S.C. § 3601 et seq. (1970).
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Dailey v. City of Lawton.18 In Dailey the city refused to grant a
rezoning necessary for the development of a low- and moder-
ate-income project. The district court had found that the purpose-
ful racial discrimination implicit in the denial of a rezoning con-
stituted a violation of the equal protection clause. 19 In a third
federal zoning case, Sisters of Providence v. City of Evanston,2 0
the district court denied a motion to dismiss, holding that an
action could be maintained under both the equal protection and
due process clauses, as well as on statutory grounds. As in Law-
ton, the city had refused to rezone a parcel of land on which a
developer proposed to build federally subsidized low- and moder-
ate-income housing.2 1
Equal protection claims were also raised in Southern Alameda
Spanish Speaking Organization (SASSO) v. City of Union City.2 2
SASSO, which was composed primarily of Mexican-American
persons, was a nonprofit sponsor of subsidized housing. The or-
ganization obtained a rezoning for land it owned in a middle-class
area of Union City. The proposed project was blocked by a
referendum which nullified the city council's action in rezoning
the parcel. A federal district court refused to enjoin the referen-
dum and after the referendum, the court of appeals declined to
overturn it. The court of appeals made no decision on the equal
protection issue but remanded to the district court, noting that a
substantial constitutional question would be raised if the plan
were discriminatory and acted to deny "decent housing and an
integrated environment to low-income residents of Union City."28
In a subsequent unpublished memorandum, the district court did
not find that the zoning denial violated equal protection rights, but
it did find that the .housing shortage for low-income residents of
Union City was so severe that failure by the city to take imme-
18425 F.2d 1037 (10th Cir. 1970), affg 296 F. Supp. 266 (W.D. Okla. 1969).
19 The site of the proposed development was zoned for public facilities and was being
used as a parochial school. The surrounding area was largely zoned for relatively high-
density residential uses. When the sponsor of a subsidized housing project sought to have
his parcel rezoned to the same classification as the surrounding area, the application was
denied. As in Lackawanna, the district court in Dailey looked at the specific facts in
concluding that the city's inaction was racially motivated, and intended to "keep a large
concentration of Negroes and other minority groups from living" in the area. 296 F. Supp.
at 269. Facts relied on in finding racial motivation included anonymous calls to the
developers, testimony of a dissenting zoning board commissioner, and the racial com-
position of the area.
20335 F. Supp. 396 (N.D. III. 1971).
21 As in Lackawanna and Dailey the complaint alleged that the city's denial was based
on racial discrimination and that there was a history of housing segregation in this racially
mixed suburb of Chicago. The court stated that "Evanston cannot deny a petition to
rezone by relying on existing zoning, absent a valid land use reason, where the effect of
this denial is to further racial discrimination." 335 F. Supp. at 404.
'22 424 F.2d 291 (9th Cir. 1970), affg 314 F. Supp. 967 (N.D. Cal. 1970).
a 424 F.2d at 295.
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diate action to alleviate the problem would result in a denial of
equal protection. The court
reserved the right ... to grant plaintiffs relief in respect to
rezoning ... if and when it finds ... that the housing situation
has become such that the failure to rezone has become, in
effect, denial of decent housing to low-income residents and
denial of equal protection of the law. 24
Crow v. Brown25 involved a related situation in which the
federal courts ventured into exclusionary suburban practices. In
this case, low-income public housing was proposed. The Atlanta
Housing Authority attempted to exercise its statutory pre-
rogatives to provide housing in suburban Fulton County, Georgia.
The county government had granted the necessary rezoning be-
fore the public housing developer acquired the land, on the as-
sumption that luxury apartments would be developed on the sites
in question. When the developer subsequently sought building
permits, he was turned down by the same county officials who had
granted the rezoning. Relying on minutes of meetings and official
24 Southern Alameda Spanish Speaking Organization v. City of Union City, No. 51590
(N.D. Cal., July 31. 1970).
2 332 F. Supp. 382 (N.D. Ga. 1971), affd per curiam, 457 F.2d 788 (5th Cir. 1972). It
has been commented that:
The Lawton-SASSO-Lackawanna rulings constituted an impressive first
round of 14th Amendment challenges to exclusionary zoning. They set forth
strong principles of law indicating that the Federal Courts were prepared to
protect minorities and the poor from zoning and planning decisions which
deprive them of equal housing opportunities. These victories, however, were
followed by a setback in April, 1971, when the U.S. Supreme Court held in
James v. Valtierra that a California constitutional provision requiring local
voter referendum approval as a prerequisite for the construction of public
housing was constitutional .... Two post-Valtierra decisions (Crow t'.
Brown, Sisters of Providence v. City of Evanston) do indicate that the lower
courts are still prepared to move boldly in ruling on Fourteenth Amendment
challenges in this area.
R. BELLMAN & A. BAKER, SUMMARY OF RECENT COURT CHALLENGES TO Ex-
CLUSIONARY LAND USE PRACTICES 5-6 (1972).
In two federal cases which have received a great deal of pretrial publicity, the plaintiffs
have alleged a variety of constitutional violations. When a subsidized housing development
was announced for the unincorporated area of St. Louis County, Missouri, the residents of
the area decided to incorporate. After receiving permission from the county council to do
so, the new municipality of Black Jack adopted a zoning ordinance which prohibited
multifamily housing on the proposed site. The plaintiffs in Park View Heights Corp. v.
City of Black Jack, 335 F. Supp. 899 (E.D. Mo. 197 1), rev'd, 467 F.2d 1208 (8th Cir.
1972) claimed that the action by the city constituted a taking of property without due
process, under the fifth and fourteenth amendments, and a violation of the right to travel,
the equal protection clause, and the thirteenth amendment. The last two claims were also
made by the plaintiffs in the subsequently filed federal suit concerning the same housing
development, United States v. City of Black Jack, Civil No. 71C-372 (E.D. Mo., filed
June 14, 1971). Other federal suits alleging that local zoning practices have violated
constitutional rights include Fair Housing Dev. Fund Corp. v. Burke, Civil No. 71-328
(E.D.N.Y., filed July 18, 1972); Accion Hispania, Inc. v. Town of New Canaan, Civil No.
B312 (D. Conn., filed June 14, 197 1); Cornwall Estates Co. v. Town of Cornwall, Civil
No. 72-3291 (S.D.N.Y., filed Aug. 2, 1972).
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memoranda, the district court found that the denial of building
permits was based on the race of the potential occupants. The
court went on to hold that the refusal to grant the permits con-
stituted a denial of equal protection.
B. Recent Zoning Cases in State Courts
Finding Constitutional Violations
Similarly, state courts have held zoning actions uncon-
stitutional. In Molino v. Mayor and Council of the Borough of
Glassboro,2 6 the New Jersey Superior Court invalidated an ordi-
nance which limited the number of bedrooms per apartment and
required that luxury amenities be included in apartment com-
plexes. The court found that the bedroom restrictions precluded
occupancy by families with children and that the amenities re-
quirement would exclude housing which was needed immediately
in the borough, "a blend of living units for middle income and low
income families." 27 The court stated:
There is a right to be free from discrimination based on
economic status. There is also a right to live as a family, and
not be subject to a limitation on the number of members of
that family in order to reside in any place. Such legal barriers
would offend the equal protection mandates of the Con-
stitution. 28
In other cases, state courts have used substantive due process
doctrine to declare local zoning actions unconstitutional.
Frequently, these opinions speak in terms of exceeding the police
power, unreasonable practices, or actions inconsistent with the
general welfare, rather than clearly articulating the due process
rationale. For instance, in Appeal of Girsh29 and Appeal of Con-
cord Township (Kit-Mar Builders, lnc.),30 the Pennsylvania Su-
preme Court held that in many circumstances total exclusions of
certain types of residential land-use and large lot-size restrictions
were completely unreasonable and outside the scope of the police
power. Recent New Jersey cases, including Oakwood at Madi-
son, Inc. v. Township of Madison,3' Southern Burlington County
26 116 N.J. Super. 195, 281 A.2d 401 (1971).
27 Id. at 202, 281 A.2d at 405.
28 Id. at 204, 281 A.2d at 405-06. See also Sager, Exclusionary Zoning: Constitutional
Limitations on the Power of Municipalities to Restrict the Use of Land, in AMERICAN
CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION PAPER (1972), for an extensive discussion of state cases up-
holding and rejecting constitutional claims.
29437 Pa. 237, 263 A.2d 395 (1970).
30439 Pa. 466, 268 A.2d 765 (1970).
31 117 N.J. Super. II, 283 A.2d 353 (1971).
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NAACP v. Township of Mount Laurel,32 and Baskerville v. Town
of Montclair,33 are at least partially grounded on concepts of due
process. Similarly, the Michigan courts have invalidated local
prohibitions against mobile home parks as being inconsistent with
the general welfare in Bristow v. City of Woodhaven 34 and Green
v. Township of Lima.35 To the extent, then, that the courts have
held local zoning actions to be illegal, these decisions have gener-
ally been based on a denial of constitutional rights.
C. Analogies to Constitutional Violations
in Other Areas of the Law
When constitutional rights are violated, basic principles come
into play relative to the relief which courts of equity must provide.
The United States Supreme Court has consistently held that in
such cases the court has a duty to provide effective relief.
Effective relief includes whatever action is necessary to right the
wrong. The principle has been most clearly and frequently stated
in the school desegregation cases. In an oft-quoted phrase, the
Supreme Court in Green v. County School Board36 set as the
standard of relief a decree "that promises realistically to work,
and promises realistically to work now." 37
In Davis v. Board of School Commissioners,38 the Supreme
Court elaborated on the Green notion and indicated the lengths to
which district courts should go in attempting to achieve school
desegregation and to provide relief for the plaintiffs:
Having once found a violation, the district judge or school
authorities should make every effort to achieve the greatest
possible degree of actual desegregation, taking into account
the practicalities of the situation. A district court may and
should consider the use of all available techniques .... 39
32 119 N.J. Super. 164, 290 A.2d 465 (1972).
33 Baskerville v. Town of Montclair, Docket No. L-35387-68 (N.J. Super. Ct., June 2,
1971).
4 35 Mich. App. 205, 192 N.W.2d 322 (1971).
35 40 Mich. App. 655, 199 N.W.2d 243 (1972).
36 391 U.S. 430 (1968).
37 Id. at 439. The Supreme Court held that the "freedom of choice" plan which was
being employed by the school board was unacceptable because it failed "to provide
meaningful assurance of prompt and effective disestablishment of a dual system" of public
education. Id. at 438. See also Kemp v. Beasley, 389 F.2d 178, 183 (8th Cir. 1968);
Wanner v. County School Bd., 357 F.2d 452, 454-55 (4th Cir. 1966).
38402 U.S. 33 (1971).
39 Id. at 37 (emphasis added). In Davis, the metropolitan area of Mobile, Alabama, was
divided by a major highway. Virtually all of the blacks in the area lived east of the
highway, and the schools there were two-thirds black. The schools to the west of the
highway were 88 percent white. The district court and the court of appeals approved
desegregation plans which treated the western section as isolated from the eastern, with
[VOL. 6:625
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In Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Board of Education,40 the
most comprehensive recent case on the equitable remedy, the
Supreme Court drew upon prior cases to support the use of
flexible means to achieve desegregation:
"In fashioning and effectuating the decrees, the courts will
be guided by equitable principles. Traditionally, equity has
been characterized by a practical flexibility in shaping its
remedies and by a facility for adjusting and reconciling public
and private needs .... To effectuate [plaintiff's interest here]
may call for elimination of a variety of obstacles in making
the transition to school systems operated in accordance with
the constitutional principles set forth in our May 17, 1954,
decision. Courts of equity may properly take into account the
public interest in the elimination of such obstacles in a sys-
tematic and effective manner. But it should go without saying
that the vitality of these constitutional principles cannot be
allowed to yield simply because of disagreement with them."
Brown v. Board of Education, 349 U.S. 294, 299-300
(1955). 41
In Swann, the Supreme Court upheld the use of complex forms
of relief, including busing to achieve school desegregation, even
though the order posed significant administrative burdens in its
implementation. 42
In the related area of voting rights, the Supreme Court has
reiterated the duty of a district court, acting as a court of equity,
to provide effective relief when constitutional rights have been
violated. In Louisiana v. United States, 43 the Supreme Court
stated that a district judge has "not merely the power but the
unified geographic zones and providing no transportation of students for desegregation
purposes. The Supreme Court held that treating these sections as isolated from each other
was error on the part of the district court since it did not adequately consider the use of all
available techniques to maximize desegregation. Because "inadequate consideration was
given to the possible use of bus transportation and split zoning," the Court remanded the
case for the development of a decree consistent with Green. Id. at 38.
40402 U.S. 1 (1971). The Supreme Court affirmed a district court order which required
the use of bus transportation for school desegregation purposes. The Court found "no
basis for holding that the local school authorities may not be required to employ bus
transportation as one tool of school desegregation. Desegregation plans cannot be limited
to the walk-in school." 402 U.S. at 30. In defining the equitable remedial power of the
district courts, the Supreme Court in Swann reemphasized the Green concerns for a
decree that is reasonable, workable, and effective. 402 U.S. at 31.
41 Id. at 12 (emphasis added).
42 Id. at 28. The Coulrt observed:
The remedy for such segregation may be administratively awkward, in-
convenient and even bizarre in some situations and may impose burdens on
some: but all awkwardness and inconvenience cannot be avoided in the
interim period when remedial adjustments are being made to eliminate the
dual school systems.
4 380 U.S. 145 (1965).
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duty to render a decree which [would] ... so far as possible
eliminate the discriminatory effects of the past as well as bar like
discrimination in the future." 44
D. The Use of Supplementary Remedies
The duty to provide effective relief in constitutional cases often
requires courts to retain jurisdiction to oversee implementation.
The courts have often issued supplemental orders, which may be
significantly different from the original order and perhaps several
years after the initial decree. The most frequent factual context is
in the area of school desegregation. Initial relief frequently con-
sisted of a "freedom of choice" plan, under which students could
choose the school they wished to attend. When these plans failed
to produce actual desegregation, district courts followed the
Green decision and issued further remedial orders, requiring radi-
cally different steps by school boards to provide effective relief.
For example, in Wright v. Council of the City of Emporia,45 the
courts have engaged in a six-year process of continuous judicial
supervision over desegregation of the Emporia, Virginia, schools.
The district court has issued three radically different types of
orders in a continuing effort to provide effective relief, in the face
of ingenious tactics by the defendants to frustrate that relief.46 In
44 Id. at 154. The district court had held unconstitutional a state statute which required
persons seeking to register to vote to pass a test involving interpretation of the Con-
stitution. The district court found that this test, which as applied gave registrars complete
discretion to determine voting qualifications without objective standards, deprived blacks
of their constitutionally protected voting rights. The district court not only enjoined further
use of the interpretation test, but also barred application of a new citizenship test, which
also had a discriminatory effect. The Supreme Court affirmed the district court decree.
407 U.S. 451 (1972). In January, 1966, the federal district court issued an order
approving a freedom of choice plan adopted by the county in April, 1965. Wright v.
County School Bd., 252 F. Supp. 378 (E.D. Va. 1966). By the advent of the 1968-69
school year, not a single white student was attending a black school under this plan. Only
ninety-eight of the county's 2,510 black students were attending white schools. Further-
more, the faculties remained completely segregated. After the Supreme Court held in
Green v. County School Bd., 391 U.S. 430, 438 (1968), that any plan is unacceptable if it
"fails to provide meaningful assurance of prompt and effective disestablishment of a dual
system," the petitioners in Emporia sought further relief. In June. 1969, three and one-half
years after the original order, the district court ordered the county to implement a "pairing
plan" submitted by the petitioners, effective at beginning of the 1969-70 school year.
Finally, in 1972, the Supreme Court affirmed a district court injunction aimed at insuring
effective desegregation of the school district. The Court held that the order was within the
remedial powers of the lower court. Wright v. Council of the City of Emporia, 407 U.S.
451 (1972). In this instance, the plan enjoined involved a new school district for the city
alone, which had been carved out of the county school district. The Supreme Court held
that a "new school district may not be created where its effect would be to impede the
process of dismantling a dual system." 407 U.S. at 470.
46 In the Green case itself, the Supreme Court looked toward the potential need for
additional implementing orders by the district court: "Moreover, whatever plan is adopted
will require evaluation in practice, and the court should retain jurisdiction until it is clear
that state-imposed segregation has been completely removed." 391 U.S. at 439.
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Kelley v. Altheimer47 the United States Court of Appeals for the
Eighth Circuit further emphasized the continuing duty of the
district courts to retain jurisdiction in school segregation cases.
The court emphasized the need to insure that a constitutionally
acceptable plan is adopted and that the plan is operated in a
constitutionally permissible fashion so that the goal of a desegre-
gated school system is rapidly and finally achieved. 48
In Louisiana v. United States,49 the Supreme Court also recog-
nized the continuing remedial duty of the district courts in the
context of voting rights:
The need to eradicate past evil effects and to prevent the
continuation or repetition in the future of the discriminatory
practices shown to be so deeply engrained in the laws, pol-
icies, and traditions of the State of Louisiana, completely
justified the District Court in entering the decree it did and in
retaining jurisdiction of the entire case ... and to enter such
orders as justice from time to time might require.50
Several principles of fashioning appropriate relief in the vindi-
cation of federal constitutional rights can be distilled from these
cases. First, the remedy must be effective: it must maximize the
actual relief sought, such as actual desegregation. Second, the
court must be flexible and consider the use of all available tech-
niques. A choice of remedies must take into account the prac-
ticalities of relief. Nor can the existence of administrative in-
convenience bar the use of a particular form of relief. Third,
courts must supervise these cases until such time as full relief has
been provided. Supplemental orders, encompassing additional or
different approaches from the original order, may be necessary to
accomplish this purpose.
These are the standards, then, against which remedies in ex-
clusionary zoning cases are to be measured. When applied in the
zoning context, a court should consider: (1) the number of actual
low- and moderate-income housing opportunities created; (2) the
use of all available techniques for achieving this end; and (3)
continuing supervision by the court until complete relief is pro-
vided. The remainder of this article seeks to demonstrate the
shortcomings of traditional remedies in exclusionary zoning cases
in terms of these standards. Thereafter it proposes alternative
forms of relief which could fulfill the courts' remedial respon-
sibilities.
47 378 F.2d 483 (8th Cir. 1967).
48 Id. at 489.
49 380 U.S. 145 (1965).5 0 1d. at 156.
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Ill. TRADITIONAL REMEDIES IN
EXCLUSIONARY ZONING CASES
Traditional exclusionary zoning litigation has proved partic-
ularly inefficacious in providing increased housing opportunities
for low- and moderate-income families. The first problem contrib-
uting to this inadequacy is illustrated in the three leading Pennsyl-
vania exclusionary zoning cases which demonstrate the true
difficulties in translating a courtroom victory into opportunities for
those economic groups in need of housing. In these cases the
plaintiff developers were not even seeking to produce low- and
moderate-income housing; rather they were attempting to use
their land more intensively in order to make a greater profit in
developing housing for the relatively affluent.
In National Land and Investment Co. v. Easttown Township
Board of Adjustment,51 the plaintiff developer challenged an ordi-
nance which required a four-acre minimum lot-size. The plaintiff
applied for and was denied a building permit to construct a
single-family home on a one-acre lot. The Pennsylvania Supreme
Court invalidated the ordinance in question on due process
grounds. In Appeal of Girsh,52 the developer sought to build two
nine-story luxury apartment houses on a tract of land zoned for
single-family dwellings on lots of no less than 20,000 square feet.
On the particular facts before it, the court held the municipality's
total prohibition on apartments invalid. Finally, in Appeal of Con-
cord Township (Kit-Mar Builders, Inc.),53 the relief requested
and granted was the right to build single-family homes on one-acre
lots, rather than the two- and three-acre lots which the township
required. In each of these three cases, the relief requested and the
remedy given were not designed to increase housing opportunities
for the nonaffluent in these communities.
A second problem in converting a judicial victory into a hous-
ing reality is the ability of municipalities to prevent development
of housing while literally complying with the court order. As one
commentator has stated:
As any experienced zoning lawyer will tell you, a victory at
the appellate level may be of limited utility if a town wishes to
frustrate a developer. There are so many points during the
process where local officials can cause delay and hamper a
51419 Pa. 504, 215 A.2d 597 (1965).
52437 Pa. 237, 263 A.2d 395 (1970).
5 439 Pa. 466, 268 A.2d 765 (1970).
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builder that a developer armed with a stunning victory at the
appellate level has only begun the fight.54
The Pennsylvania cases previously discussed illustrate the further
roadblocks local communities can erect to resist the development
of housing even after judicial decisions which are adverse to the
communities:
None of the landmark decisions of the Supreme Court of
Pennsylvania ... resulted in a victory for the builder in the
sense that the builder was able, as a result of litigation, to
construct the development he proposed to build. Joseph
Girsh never built his apartments. After the decision of the
Supreme Court, In re Girsh ... the Township classified sev-
eral properties other than that owned by Girsh for apartment
development. The present owners of the Girsh property are
still attempting to convince the Township and the courts that
apartments should be permitted on the tract involved in the
Girsh case. In fact, the Girsh property, possibly as a result of
the persistence demonstrated by the would-be developers,
has now been condemned as a public park ....
Kit-Mar Builders ... are still negotiating for subdivision
approval.... Finally, even after the Supreme Court in-
validated the four-acre zoning involved in National Land and
Investment Co. v. Easttown Township Board of Adjust-
ment .... Easttown Township then threatened to impose
three-acre zoning. National Land finally abandoned its effort
to build on one-acre lots, and the case was settled at two-acre
minimum lots. 55
In the subsidized housing context evasive tactics are even more
readily available to communities acting in bad faith. 56 Judicial
orders which are not specifically grounded in the realities of the
local development process are likely to result in the community's
preventing the development of unwanted housing.
Thus, the types of remedies traditionally provided by courts in
exclusionary zoning cases have done little to alleviate the plight of
low- and moderate-income families. They have not provided ac-
tual housing opportunities. The means used have been limited to
prohibitive and injunctive ones, rather than flexible, affirmative
approaches. Finally, the courts have generally failed to supervise
11 Hearings before United States Commission on Civil Rights, July 14- 17, 197 1, at 853
(testimony of Mr. Trubek. Hearing Exhibit No. 32) [hereinafter cited as Trubek].
51 Brief for Appellants at 45-47, Commonwealth v. County of Bucks, 22 Bucks County
L. Rep. 179 (Ct. C.P. 1972), appeal docketed Commonwealth Ct. Pa., 27 T.D. 1972.
56 See generally Trubek, supra note 54.
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the progress of a case after the initial order, thus inviting evasion
by the locality.
IV. PAST EXPERIENCE WITH
AFFIRMATIVE APPROACHES
A. Zoning Cases
Past experience has demonstrated that wholly negative rem-
edies in exclusionary zoning cases do not provide complete
relief. As a result, both federal and state courts have begun to
order affirmative action rather than merely prohibiting further
action. In Kennedy Park Homes Association v. City of Lack-
awanna,57 the district court held that Lackawanna has an "obliga-
tion to consider and plan for all of the citizens in the commu-
nity. "58 The court ordered defendants to take whatever
affirmative steps were necessary to allow the proposed project to
begin construction. Among other things, the court ordered the
defendants to provide adequate sewage service and to issue the
necessary building permits for the project. 59
In Southern Alameda Spanish Speaking Organization (SAS-
SO) v. City of Union City,60 the municipality was ordered
by the court to take affirmative steps to insure equal availability of
housing in the future. Union City was ordered to develop an
appropriate plan to provide for the construction of low- and mod-
erate-income housing. The district court had required the town to
take major action to remedy the plaintiffs' grievances within a
ten-month period. It also suggested that advantage should be
taken of available federal assistance:
Such steps shall include, so far as necessary and reason-
57318 F. Supp. 669 (W.D.N.Y. 1969), affd, 436 F.2d 108 (2d Cir. 1970), cert. denied,
401 U.S. 1010(1971).
-5318 F. Supp. at 697.
59 The remedy ordered by the court in Lackawanna contained inter alia the following
instructions:
2. That... defendants shall immediately take whatever action is neces-
sary to provide adequate sewage service to the K.P.H.A. subdivision.
5. That defendants affirmatively take whatever steps are necessary to
allow the Kennedy Park Subdivision to begin construction.
6. That defendants be enjoined from issuing building permits for any
construction in the second and third wards which will contribute additional
sanitary sewage to the municipal system until Kennedy Park Subdivision has
been granted permission to tap into the sewer system by the appropriate
authority.
Id. at 697-98.
60424 F.2d 291 (9th Cir. 1970).
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ably feasible under the law, not only encouragement and, if
possible, implementation of programs dependent on the in-
itiative of private residential developers and upon the cooper-
ation of private landowners or occupants, e.g., Section 235
and 236 programs, the so-called Section 23 Alameda County
low-cost leasing program and housing rehabilitation grant and
loan program (including, if possible, implementation of the
SASSO housing Section 236 program either as now proposed
or as modified) but also public housing programs requiring the
exercise of the fiscal and eminent domain powers of the City
if such be necessary and reasonably feasible under the law to
accomplish the object of this order in the event that private
initiative and landowner cooperation (over which admittedly
the City has no control) are insufficient to reasonably accom-
modate the housing needs of low income residents (e.g., pub-
lic housing, public urban renewal programs and other similar
public programs designed for that purpose).61
In Southern Burlington County NAACP v. Township of Mount
Laurel,62 a New Jersey court held a zoning ordinance uncon-
stitutional because it acted to exclude completely multifamily
developments and mobile homes. The court ordered broad,
affirmative relief and ordered Mount Laurel Township to prepare
a plan which included consideration of the housing needs of
present and prospective low- and moderate-income persons. The
township was further ordered to decide upon the estimated num-
ber of both low- and moderate-income units which should be
constructed each year.63 In addition to the preparation of a plan,
the court ordered the township to develop "an affirmative pro-
gram" to encourage the satisfaction of local housing needs. The
plan was to utilize the most effective and thorough means by
which municipal action could accomplish the desired goals. 64
B. Low-Income Housing Cases
The site-selection cases involving low-income housing provide
another example of courts' requiring affirmative action to remedy
the effects of past discrimination. In Gautreaux v. Chicago Hous-
ing Authority,65 a detailed order was entered compelling the Chi-
cago Housing Authority to prepare a plan for the construction of
61 Southern Alameda Spanish Speaking Organization v. City of Union City. No. 51590
(N.D. Cal., July 31, 1970).
62 119 N.J. Super. 164, 290 A.2d 465 (1972).
63 Id. at 178, 290 A.2d at 473.
4 Id. at 179, 290 A.2d at 474.
6 304 F. Supp. 736 (N.D. Ill. 1969).
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public housing units in predominantly white areas of the city. The
plan was to include designation of specific sites. After several
years of litigation subsequent to the initial order the trial judge
entered a second order which required additional action by the
housing authority. The housing authority was directed to file with
the court a final list of the sites for the construction of public
housing. In addition, the authority was ordered to prepare a list of
all the vacant residentially-zoned parcels of land within the area in
which the court had concluded that additional public housing
should be constructed.66
In Crow v. Brown,67 the federal district court issued an order
requiring the issuance of building permits for two specific public
housing projects. In addition, the court ordered that a site-
selection committee be established for the purpose of selecting
sites for additional low-income housing. Moreover, the activities
of the site-selection committee were not restricted to the city of
Atlanta. On appeal, the opinion and order of the district court
were affirmed. Similar orders were entered by district courts in
Garrett v. City of Hamtramck68 and Banks v. Perk.69 In these
cases local authorities were ordered to plan affirmatively for non-
segregated housing at scattered sites throughout the city.
C. Other Uses of the Affirmative Approach
Cases dealing with the provision of municipal services offer yet
another example of the courts' requiring affirmative action in
order to remedy the effects of past discrimination. In Hawkins v.
Town of Shaw, 70 a federal court of appeals declared that a munici-
pality cannot discriminate in the provision of municipal services
and required the town to submit a plan for the equitable dis-
tribution of these services. In a similar case, Haduot v. City of
Prattville,71 the court found discrimination in the provision of
various facilities in municipal parks. The court ordered the city to
equalize the equipment, facilities, and services provided in a park
located in a black neighborhood with those provided in white
neighborhoods.
Another category of cases involving the provision of effective,
affirmative relief is that group of cases which deal with problems
of school desegregation. Courts have long expounded the position
66 Gautreaux v. Chicago Housing Authority, 342 F. Supp. 827, 830-31 (N.D. III. 1972).
67 332 F. Supp. 382 (N.D. Ga. 1971), affld, 457 F.2d 788 (5th Cir. 1972).
68335 F. Supp. 16 (E.D. Mich. 1971).
69 341 F. Supp. 1175 (N.D. Ohio 1972).
70437 F.2d 1286 (5th Cir. 1971).
71 309 F. Supp. 967 (M.D. Ala. 1970).
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that they have an affirmative obligation to ensure the success of
desegregation decrees. It is not enough merely to strike down a
school board's actions as unconstitutional. In Bradley v. Milli-
ken,72 the district court found that it was the duty of the court to
order a program of affirmative action, metropolitan in scope, to be
devised where the facts indicate that such drastic remedies are
necessary to provide a complete remedy for state-approved racial
segregation.
In zoning and related cases, courts are increasingly willing to
use affirmative remedies to fulfill their duty to provide effective
remedies for the prior violation of constitutional rights. On occa-
sion, the courts have recognized a need for fashioning remedies
which extend beyond the confines of the locality in issue. In other
cases innovative, far-reaching techniques have been used to
achieve constitutional objectives. Often the courts retain jurisdic-
tion to supervise implementation of relief. The refinement and
extension of these approaches in exclusionary zoning cases re-
main to be seen.
V. APPLICATION OF THE AFFIRMATIVE RELIEF
APPROACH TO EXCLUSIONARY ZONING CASES
A. Single-Site Relief
The simplest case in which affirmative relief might appropriate-
ly be used is the single-site rezoning situation. Typically a devel-
oper owns a specific piece of land on which he desires to build
low- and moderate-income housing. After applying for a neces-
sary rezoning, his application is rejected. In the past, successful
litigation has brought the developer only limited relief, requiring at
most that the municipality rezone the parcel.7 3 This injunctive
approach has proven to be ineffective because it has failed to
recognize the realities of the local administrative process.
A rapid determination of whether the developer will be able to
proceed with his activities, a determination essential to the suc-
cess of almost any real estate development, is impossible, if the
relief accorded the developer is limited to rezoning. This is the
case because
72 Bradley v. Milliken, 338 F. Supp. 582 (ED. Mich. 1972), affid, - F.2d- (6th Cir.
1972), rehearing en banc granted, -F.2d- (1973). See also Swann v. Char-
lotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ.. 402 U.S. 1 (1971): Davis v. Board of School Comm'rs,
402 U.S. 33 (197 1): Haney v. County Bd. of Educ., 410 F.2d 920 (8th Cir. 1969); Jenkins
v. Township of Morris School Dist., 58 N.J. 483, 279 A.2d 619 (1971).
73 See notes 54-56 and accompanying text supra.
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[t]he number of review agencies that a developer has to go
through increases the likelihood of administrative delays. At a
minimum he is likely to face the planning board, the commis-
sion, and the board of zoning appeals or adjustment-plus the
zoning enforcement officer, the building inspector, and the
health department. He is probably at the mercy of the fire
department, water and sewer authorities or a public works
department, the engineering department, the school board,
the traffic department or state highway department, the park
and recreational department or park authority, the redevelop-
ment and housing authority, and so on. He may also be
subject to review by a design or architectural review com-
mittee, a conservation department, . . . [or a] site plan review
committee. In other words, if... [a local] administration
should find delay an enticing form of exclusion, it would be
difficult to avoid.74
Thus, even if the developer is victorious in his challenge to the
existing zoning regulations, he must overcome further hurdles
before he receives effective relief-the opportunity to engage in
the actual building of housing for low- and moderate-income fami-
lies.
As was the case with the school desegregation cases, in which
the courts sought new remedies when those first attempted proved
ineffective, so should the courts seek to design innovative ap-
proaches when faced with local evasive tactics in the zoning
context. These tactics may include: (1) misuse of the adminis-
trative approval framework; (2) refusal to provide the local ap-
provals necessary for the use of federal subsidy programs; and (3)
general delay, which may result in the loss of an option or the
land's being turned over to a developer who is not interested in
developing low- and moderate-income housing.
In response to dilatory administrative tactics, the court could
use a remedy provided in the Massachusetts anti-snob zoning
statute. 75 In Massachusetts, the legislative response to the prob-
lem of remedies in zoning cases has been a one-step, com-
prehensive permit approach. Certain sponsors of subsidized hous-
ing are permitted to forgo seeking multiple local approvals. Rath-
er, one local board of appeals initially reviews and approves all
permits in a single hearing process. If the local board denies the
omnibus permits, the sponsor can appeal to a state board. The
state board can order the issuance of a comprehensive permit if it
7 4
M. BROOKS, LOWER INCOME HOUSING: THE PLANNER'S RESPONSE (Am. Soc'y of
Planning Officials 1972).
75 MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 40B, §§ 20-23 (Supp. 1971).
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finds that the original decision was inconsistent with local needs.
Furthermore, this system prevents the locality from using nonzon-
ing regulatory powers to exclude a project after the state board
has reversed the local decision denying the developer's appli-
cation. 76
The comprehensive permit approach employed in the Mas-
sachusetts statute is also possible in the judicial setting as a
response to administrative delay. As a corollary to the duty to
provide effective relief where a federal constitutional wrong has
been demonstrated, a district court has the power to set aside
state or local laws which impede complete relief, even when those
laws do not violate any provision of the constitution. 77 Thus,
where necessary to remedy the effects of past discrimination,
local officials may be ordered to ignore state law, and actions
taken or proposed to be taken under otherwise valid state laws
may be enjoined. 78
This principle, which requires interference with collateral laws
which are otherwise valid, has been most readily employed in
cases of racial discrimination. Thus, in Louisiana v. United
States,79 the Supreme Court, while declining to pass on the valid-
ity of a statutorily authorized voter-qualification test, affirmed a
district court order enjoining use of the test in twenty-one Loui-
siana parishes until past discrimination in those parishes had been
remedied. Similarly, in Haney v. County Board of Education, °
the required remedy for school segregation necessitated annexa-
tion of a school district and establishment of a new school board
for the resulting enlarged district, even though this order involved
ignoring and perhaps violating other state law. The court stated
that the remedial equitable powers of a federal court under the
fourteenth amendment are not limited by state law."'
This method of relief has come to the foreground most dramati-
cally in the recent cases involving transportation of students
76 Id. § 23.
77 Some cases speak loosely of the invalidity of the state law which is thus collaterally
enjoined. In United States v. Greenwood Municipal Separate School Dist., 406 F.2d
1086, at 1094 (5th Cir. 1969), the court stated that "a state law is invalidated to the extent
that it frustrates the implementation of a constitutional mandate." The better view seems
to be that "[tihe question of the law's validity never arises .... its disregard is directed as
a matter of remedy alone, in order to undo the effects of proved unconstitutionally
discriminatory acts." See also Bradley v. School Bd., 324 F. Supp. 396, 400 (E.D. Va.
1971), rev'd, 462 F.2d 1058 (4th Cir. 1972), cert. granted, 41 U.S.L.W. 3391 (U.S. Jan. 8,
1973) (Nos. 72-549, 72-550); Southern Alameda Spanish Speaking Organization (SASSO)
v. City of Union City, 424 F.2d 291, 296 (9th Cir. 1970).78 United States v. Texas, 321 F. Supp. 1043 (E.D. Tex. 1970); Burleson v. County Bd.
of Election Comm'rs, 308 F. Supp. 352 (E.D. Ark. 1970).
79380 U.S. 145 (1965).
80429 F.2d 364 (8th Cir. 1970).
8' Id. at 368.
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across school district boundaries to achieve racial balance. In
Bradley v. School Board,8 2 the defendants contended the relief
sought would have the effect of enjoining them from enforcing or
complying with state law. The district court stated:
Assuming arguendo that this Court, in granting relief re-
quested, required certain of the defendants to fail to comply
with a requirement of state law, such an order would not
necessarily imply a holding that the statute violated was un-
constitutional.
... The question of the law's validity never arises; its dis-
regard is directed as a matter of remedy alone, in order to
undo the effects of proved constitutionally discriminatory
acts. 83
In a situation closely analogous to rezoning, a federal district
court in Gautreaux v. Chicago Housing Authority8 4 ordered the
housing authority to proceed to plan and develop low-rent public
housing on selected sites, even though the city council had not
approved the sites as required by state law. The state law was set
aside for purposes of the particular housing sites in question. The
setting aside was necessary to provide housing on a desegregated
basis in order to remedy past discrimination. The validity of the
state law was not in issue, nor were the reasons for inaction by
the city council. Indeed, the city council might have had reasons
for not approving the sites which would otherwise have been
perfectly valid. In order to be applicable, then, the set-aside
principle requires only that the operation of a state or local law be
frustrating constitutionally required relief. In the exclusionary
zoning context, the local approval process might be set aside
without challenging its validity when it frustrates the necessary
relief, construction of low- and moderate-income housing.
In all of these cases legislative judgments on complex matters
were overridden when it was determined by a court that adher-
ence to those judgments would frustrate the constitutional man-
date to remedy discrimination. Thus, discretionary as well as
ministerial actions can be limited by the set-aside power. In the
zoning context, the set-aside process would allow the developer to
82324 F. Supp. 396 (E.D. Va. 1971), rev'd, 462 F.2d 1058 (4th Cir. 1972), cert.
granted, 41 U.S.L.W. 3391 (U.S. Jan. 8, 1973) (Nos. 72-549, 72-550).
83 324 F. Supp. at 400-01. See also Kelley v. Metropolitan County Bd. of Educ., 463
F.2d 732 (6th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 41 U.S.L.W. 3254 (U.S. Nov. 6, 1972); Franklin v.
Quitman County Bd. of Educ., 288 F. Supp. 509 (N.D. Miss. 1968); Bradley v. Milliken,
338 F. Supp. 582 (E.D. Mich. 1972), affd, -F.2d- (6th Cir. 1972), rehearing en banc
granted, -F.2d- (1973).
84342 F. Supp. 827 (N.D. Ill. 1972).
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bypass otherwise valid local regulations such as building code
requirements or subdivision approvals because the court has the
power to set aside these requirements to initiate construction. To
obtain a local set-aside order, the developer would be required to
show that he made a good faith effort to obtain necessary local
approvals, that the city denied approval, and that the denial is
now frustrating complete relief.
In a recent complaint involving a denial of a rezoning for
subsidized housing, Metropolitan Housing Development Corp. v.
Village of Arlington Heights, 5 the plaintiffs requested relief
which would
enjoin all defendants from enforcing any zoning ordinance or
other restriction as to the subject property which would pro-
hibit the proposed development and from refusing to take any
affirmative steps necessary for plaintiff MHDC to begin and
complete construction.86
The plaintiffs recognized the potential for the imposition of other
obstacles even if the rezoning were granted. They therefore re-
quested that the court grant relief which would be effective and
that the court retain jurisdiction until construction was completed.
A similar affirmative requirement might be placed on the commu-
nity to provide any local approvals necessary for the use of
federal subsidy programs.8 7
To insure that a site is actually used for low- and moder-
ate-income housing, even if ownership changes, the court could
make the rezoning conditional upon the owner's developing only
low- and moderate-income housing. This solution resembles con-
tract zoning. Exactly what is meant by contract zoning is unclear,
although the term refers generally to the zoning authority's con-
senting to zoning changes contingent upon the landowner's agree-
ing to specific conditions upon the use of the land. 88 Some courts
maintain that these arrangements are prima facie evidence of spot
zoning, 89 while others uphold this approach on the theory that the
court or zoning board, in exercising its discretion to grant a
rezoning based on the peculiar hardship to the applicant, may
limit or condition the rezoning in such a way as to maximize the
benefits to the community as well as to the landowner.9 0 In the
85Civil No. 72C-1453 (N.D. Ill., filed June 12, 1972).
86 Id., plaintiffs complaint at 23.
87 See part V B 6 infra.
88 See generally Strine, The Use of Conditions in Land Use Control, 67 DICK. L. REV.
109 (1963); Trager, Contract Zoning, 23 MD. L. REV. 121 (1963).
9See, e.g., Bayliss v. City of Baltimore, 219 Md. 164, 148 A.2d 429 (1959); 3 C.
RATHKOPF, THE LAW OF ZONING AND PLANNING 74-1 et seq. (3d ed. 1972).
9 0 Church v. Town of Islip, 8 N.Y.2d 254, 168 N.E.2d 680, 203 N.Y.S.2d 866 (1960).
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exclusionary zoning situation the argument for upholding the im-
position of conditions seems particularly persuasive. The land-
owner or other interested party is asking for a rezoning (to change
otherwise valid zoning) to fulfill a need for low- and moder-
ate-income housing.
B. The Regional Impact Approach
Beyond affirmative relief related to a specific site, it is in-
creasingly apparent that relief in the form of housing for low- and
moderate-income families must be provided on a regional basis.9
The courts have recognized the regional nature of local zoning
actions, particularly those related to housing. The land-use deci-
sions of any one community have a significant impact on sur-
rounding municipalities, as well as on the region as a whole.
Consequently, rational planning of low- and moderate-income
housing can only take place on a multiple community scale. It is
only in the regional context that the remedial obligations of a
single municipality can be established.
1. Case Law Development of the Regional Approach-The
first United States Supreme Court decision upholding the con-
stitutionality of zoning foreshadowed almost fifty years ago the
recent trend toward recognition of the regional impact of zoning
decisions. In Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co.,92 the Court
pointed to the position of suburban Euclid in the Cleveland metro-
politan area and raised the "possibility of cases where the general
public interest would so far outweigh the interest of the municipal-
ity that the municipality would not be allowed to stand in the
way." 93 Recent zoning decisions, particularly in the state courts
of New Jersey and Pennsylvania, support this broad geographic
definition of the term general welfare. Increasingly, the judicial
inquiry relates the consistency of a local zoning practice or action
not only with the needs of the individual community, but with the
welfare of the larger region or metropolitan area.
More elaborate principles of the regional nature of zoning were
articulated as early as 1949. In Duffcon Concrete Products v.
Borough of Cresskill,9 4 the Supreme Court of New Jersey clearly
91 Officials at all levels of government, as well as leaders of concerned private groups,
are on record in support of the need for metropolitan or regional solutions to the low- and
moderate-income housing problem. Other urban experts who have studied this question
have also reached the same conclusion. See, e.g., statement by President Richard Nixon
on federal policies relative to equal housing, N.Y. Times, June 12, 1972, at I, col. 8.
92272 U.S. 365 (1926).
93 Id. at 390.
94 1 N.J. 509, 64 A.2d 347 (1949).
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indicated that local zoning decisions must take into account re-
gional effects:
What may be the most appropriate use of any particular
property depends not only on all the conditions, physical,
economic and social, prevailing within the municipality and
its needs, present and reasonably prospective, but also on the
nature of the entire region in which the minicipality is located
and the use to which the land in that region has been or may
be put most advantageously. The effective development of a
region should not and cannot be made to depend upon the
adventitious location of municipal boundaries, often pre-
scribed decades or even centuries ago, and based in many
instances on considerations of geography, of commerce, or of
politics that are no longer significant with respect to zoning.95
Two decades later, a New Jersey court reiterated the principle
that the general welfare crosses municipal boundaries, particularly
with regard to housing. In invalidating a zoning amendment which
had the effect of permitting only luxury apartments, the court in
Molino v. Mayor and Council of Borough of Glassboro9" stated:
No municipality can isolate itself from the difficulties which
are prevalent in all segments of society. When the general
public interest is paramount to the limited interest of the
municipality then the municipality cannot create road
blocks.9 7
Having identified the region as a geographic base for certain
zoning decisions and having designated housing as one of the
matters of regional concern, these courts have begun to indicate
that local communities have a legal responsibility to accept their
proportionate share of low- and middle-income housing.
Applying this principle, the court in Oakwood at Madison, Inc.
v. Township of Madison9" held an entire zoning ordinance uncon-
stitutional because it included illegal minimum lot-size provisions.
The New Jersey Superior Court found that housing was a land
use with a regional impact, thus obligating each community to
accept a proportionate share of the regional need:
Regional needs are a proper consideration in local zoning. ...
In pursuing the valid zoning purpose of a balanced commu-
nity, a municipality must not ignore housing needs, that is, its
fair proportion of the obligation to meet the housing needs of
95 Id. at 513, 64 A.2d at 349- 50 (emphasis added).
96 116 N.J. Super. 195, 281 A.2d 401 (1971).
97 Id. at 204, 281 A.2d at 406.
98 117 N.J. Super. 11, 283 A.2d 353 (1971).
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its own population and of the region. Housing needs are
encompassed within the general welfare. The general welfare
does not stop at each municipal boundary. Large areas of
vacant and undeveloped land should not be zoned as Madison
Township has, to such minimum lot sizes and with such other
restrictions that regional as well as local housing needs are
shunted aside. 99
The Pennsylvania Supreme Court has also declared invalid
several zoning ordinances which possessed an exclusionary im-
pact. The one factor that has emerged as decisive in all three
cases is the regional impact of zoning ordinances which operate to
preclude certain persons from living within the communities
zoned in an exclusionary manner. The recognition given to these
interests-unrepresented in the traditional sense-in all three
cases shows that the Pennsylvania court regards housing as a
matter of regional concern which must be accommodated by all
the communities of a metropolitan region.
In National Land and Investment Co. v. Easttown Township
Board of Adjustment,10 0 the issue before the Pennsylvania Su-
preme Court was the validity of a zoning ordinance establishing a
minimum lot-size of four acres. The court concluded that the
ordinance had been adopted primarily for exclusionary purposes
rather than for the prevention of sewage disposal problems as the
township had contended. The court further held that it was an
unreasonable exercise of the police power to prevent population
growth in the community as a means of retaining its character:
[Zoning] must not and can not be used by... officials to shirk
their responsibilities. Zoning is a means by which a govern-
mental body can plan for the future-it may not be used as a
means to deny the future .... Zoning provisions may not be
used, however to avoid the increased responsibilities and
economic burdens which time and national growth invariably
bring.'01
Five years after National Land, in Appeal of Girsh,10 2 the
Pennsylvania Supreme Court invalidated a zoning ordinance be-
cause it failed to provide for apartments in the zoning plan of the
town concerned. The Girsh court took little note of the town-
ship's purported rationale: that apartments had in fact been
allowed in the township by means of variances and that the lack
99 Id. at 20, 283 A.2d 358 (emphasis added).
100419 Pa. 504, 215 A.2d 597 (1965).
101 Id. at 527-28, 215 A.2d at 610.
102437 Pa. 237, 263 A.2d 395 (1970).
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of such uses in the zoning plan did not amount to an express
prohibition of apartments. The town also argued that apartment
uses would cause a significant strain on available municipal ser-
vices and roads. In rejecting these arguments the court focused on
the causes and effects of exclusionary zoning, taking note of the
suburban antipathy toward apartments and pointing out statistics
which support the need for more apartments in the suburbs. The
opinion emphasized the fact that the challenged zoning ordinance
significantly reduced the opportunities for those outside the com-
munity to move into it in search of housing:
Appellee here has simply made a decision that it is content
with things as they are, and that the expense or change in
character that would result from people moving in to find "a
comfortable place to live" are for someone else to worry
about. That decision is unacceptable.... [T]he suburbs,
which at one time were merely "bedrooms" for those who
worked in the urban core, are now becoming active business
areas in their own right. It follows then that formerly "out-
lying", somewhat rural communities, are now becoming logi-
cal areas for development and population growth-in a sense,
suburbs to the suburbs.10 3
The court further pointed out the danger implicit in such ex-
clusionary tactics:
Municipal services must be provided somewhere, and if
Nether Providence is a logical place for development to take
place, it should not be heard to say that it will not bear its
rightful part of the burden.10 4
The same judicial attitude was displayed in Appeal of Concord
Township (Kit-Mar Builders, Inc.),10 5 the third of the Pennsylva-
nia cases. In this case, the court, on facts very similar to those in
National Land, invalidated a minimum lot-size ordinance. Al-
though the court acknowledged that the form of litigation seemed
to involve the due process rights of the landowner whose property
had suffered the adverse zoning, the fundamental issue concerned
the rights of nonresidents who sought housing in the area:
[C]ommunities must deal with the problems of population
growth. They may not refuse to confront the future by adopt-
ing zoning regulations that effectively restrict population to
near present levels. It is not for any given Township to say
103 Id. at 244, 263 A.2d at 398.
104 Id.,at 244-45, 263 A.2d at 398-99 (emphasis added).
105439 Pa. 466, 268 A.2d 765 (1970).
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who may or may not live within its confines, while dis-
regarding the interests of the entire area. If Concord Town-
ship is successful in unnaturally limiting its population growth
through the use of exclusive zoning regulations, the people
who would normally live there will inevitably have to live in
another community, and the requirement that they do so is
not a decision that Concord Township should alone be able to
make.
... [This] power currently resides in the hands of each
local governing unit, and we will not tolerate their abusing
that power in attempting to zone out growth at the expense of
neighboring communities.
10 6
In viewing housing and zoning as matters of regional concern,
the New Jersey and Pennsylvania courts have recognized the
realities of population growth and mobility. This point of view has
resulted in the courts' adopting an expanded concept of the gener-
al welfare embracing the fact that the suburbs must share the
burden of population growth, that interests other than those of
local inhabitants must be considered by local authorities of subur-
ban communities, and that outsiders have an important interest in
the housing available in suburban areas. 10 7
2. Possible Definitions of the Region-Defining the "region" is
conceptually the first step in designing a regional remedy. A
number of publicly defined regions exist which are arguably rele-
vant in fashioning a regional remedy. Plaintiff will, of course,
initially suggest a relevant region. Ultimately resolution of this
issue will be for the court.
a. The County-In Commonwealth v. County of Bucks, 10 8 the
plaintiffs urged the county as the relevant region. Bucks County is
adjacent to Philadelphia and contains fifty-four municipalities,
each of which is a defendant in the suit. The plaintiffs suggested
106 Id. at 474-75, 476, 268 A.2d at 768-69 (emphasis added).
'
0 7See also Borough of Cresskill v. Borough of Dumont, 15 N.J. 238, 104 A.2d 441
(1954); Gartland v. Maywood, 45 N.J. Super. 1, 131 A.2d 529 (1957). For extensive
discussions of regional considerations in zoning, see Comment, The Pennsylvania Su-
preme Court and Exclusionary Suburban Zoning: From Bilbar to Girsh-A Decade of
Change, 16 VILL. L. REV. 507 (1971); Davidoff & Davidoff, Opening the Suburbs:
Towards Inclusionary Land Use Controls, 22 SYRACUSE L. REV. 509 (1971); Bowe,
Regional Planning versus Decentralized Land Use Controls-Zoning For the Megalo-
polis, 18 DEPAUL L. REV. 144 (1968); Marcus, Exclusionary Zoning: The Need for a
Regional Planning Context, 16 N.Y.L.F. 732 (1970); Note, Regional Impact of Zoning:A
Suggested Approach, 114 U. PA. L. REV. 1251 (1966); Krasnowiecki, Zoning Litigation
and the New Pennsylvania Procedures, 120 U. PA. L. REV. 1029 (1972); Walsh, Are
Local Zoning Bodies Required by the Constitution to Consider Regional Needs?, 3 CONN.
L. REV. 244 (1971).
108 22 Bucks Co. L. Rep. 179 (Ct. C.P. 1972), appeal docketed Commonwealth Ct. Pa.,
27 T.D. 1972.
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the county as the appropriate unit in considering regional
influences because:
[T]he legislature has designated the county as the appropriate
planning unit by granting county planning commissions the
authority to adopt comprehensive plans for counties .... The
municipalities are required to give such county com-
prehensive plan consideration in their own planning and zon-
ing .... Moreover, the Bucks County Planning Commission
is presently preparing such a comprehensive plan, aided by a
grant of federal funds .... Therefore, the Bucks County Plan-
ning Commission is required to include the consideration of
housing for low-income and moderate-income persons in its
comprehensive plan. 1°9
b. The Multicounty Area - In some situations the appropriate
region for providing low- and moderate-income housing remedies
would include two or more counties. In the related area of school
desegregation, a federal district court has defined a multicounty
region for purposes of relief. The court, in Bradley v. Milliken,110
determined that desegregation could not be achieved within the
boundaries of the City of Detroit and ordered the development of
a metropolitan desegregation plan based on a three-county area.
c. The Standard Metropolitan Statistical Area-The Federal
Office of Management and Budget recognizes approximately 250
Standard Metropolitan Statistical Areas (SMSA) in the 1970 cen-
sus."' Generally, an SMSA is a county or a group of contiguous
counties which contains at least one city of 50,000 people. In
addition to the county or counties containing such a city or cities,
contiguous counties are included in an SMSA if, according to
certain criteria, they are socially and economically integrated with
the central city.
d. The Urbanized Area-The term urbanized area is a creation
of the United States Bureau of the Census. The major objective of
the Census Bureau in delineating urbanized areas is to provide
better separation of urban and rural housing within SMSAs. As
defined by the Census Bureau, an urbanized area consists of a
central city or cities of 50,000 or more inhabitants and surround-
ing closely settled territory." 2
109 Brief for Appellants at 48-49, Commonwealth v. County of Bucks, 22 Bucks Co. L.
Rep. 179 (Ct. C.P. 1972), appeal docketed Commonwealth Ct. Pa., 27 T.D. 1972.
110338 F. Supp. 582 (E.D. Mich. 1971), aff d, -F.2d- (6th Cir. 1972), rehearing en
banc granted, -F.2d- (1973).
Il U.S. DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE, 1970 CENSUS TRACTS, CHICAGO, ILLINOIS
SMSA, pt. 2 at App. 2.
112 U.S. DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE, 1970 CENSUS OF HOUSING, GENERAL HOUSING
CHARACTERISTICS, ILLINOIS HC(I)-A 15, Appendix A, p.2.
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The urbanized area has been urged as the relevant region in
recent litigation. In seeking the provision of desegregated
low-income housing on a regional basis, the plaintiffs in Gaut-
reaux v. Chicago Housing Authority proposed that the "region"
be defined as the Chicago "urbanized area." 113 The case had
originally involved segregation in public housing within the City
of Chicago. Relief was sought outside the city, in addition to
that already granted within the city, when the plaintiffs concluded
that a regional approach was necessary to provide long-term de-
segregated housing opportunities. The Chicago urbanized area
was urged in Gautreaux as the appropriate area for relief since it
excludes rural areas, which are not suited to receive subsidized
housing for low-income Chicago residents. The lack of proximity
of jobs and public transportation also excluded these rural areas
from consideration. Furthermore, the urbanized area is large
enough to insure that there would be enough vacant land to build
the necessary units for the plaintiffs, while avoiding the problem
of undue concentration of low-income families.
e. The Housing Market Area- H U D defines "housing market
areas" throughout the country, for which it undertakes market
analyses every two years.' 14 These are areas which presumably
represent coherent markets in which there is a certain amount of
mobility and identity of available housing.
These five concepts do not exhaust the possibilities for defining
the region. For example, an area which includes parts of two or
more states might constitute a region. The region around Wash-
ington, D.C., would undoubtedly include substantial portions of
Maryland and Virginia. The definitional problem is made simpler,
however, by the fact that many of the possible definitions will
coincide. Generally, the Housing Market Area is identical to the
SMSA, which is identical to a county or multi-county area.
3. Factors To Be Considered in Defining the Region-If al-
ternative definitions are available in a particular case, the determi-
nation of the appropriate region should be based on several fac-
tors. First, if a designated planning commission already exists, on
either a county or regional basis, the geographical jurisdiction of
that agency should be considered.115 Those boundary lines repre-
113 304 F. Supp. 736 (N.D. I1. 1969). The term, in this instance, refers to the central
city, Chicago, and the closely surrounding settled areas, which include most of Cook and
DuPage counties, a strip along Lake Michigan in Lake County, and a small portion of Will
County. The urbanized area extends into Indiana, but the region was limited to the Illinois
portion.
114 Interview with Preston Caplan, Area Economist, Chicago Area Office, U.S. Depart-
ment of Housing and Urban Development, in Chicago, Ill., Jan. 19, 1973.
115 A possible complication here is that both county and regional planning agencies may
have been designated for the same area.
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sent a legislative identification of a coherent, interrelated area for
planning purposes. In addition to the deference due that assess-
ment, use of the planning agency's jurisdiction insures the avail-
ability of an expert body capable of carrying out the planning
necessary to effectuate a remedial decree.116
A second related factor is that the region should be the area
within which development and movement are currently taking
place and in which they will continue in the foreseeable future.
These areas are places where middle-income families have al-
ready exercised their option to move, places which have been
identified as appropriate for regional growth and mobility. 117
From the plaintiff's perspective, the area should be perceived as a
region by low- and moderate-income people, and it should be
relatively homogeneous in character. The area should include
locations which would be desirable to low- and moderate-income
groups if housing opportunities were available. It should not in-
clude areas which are presently rural or agricultural and likely to
remain so indefinitely, or which possess few job opportunities, or
are otherwise unattractive to groups which may presently be
excluded from the suburbs. For example, the SMSA may be
inappropriately expansive in some metropolitan areas. The Chi-
cago SMSA includes two counties which are predominantly rural
in character. Including those counties in a remedial plan might
merely further complicate the effectuation of relief and perhaps
result in unnecessary community opposition in the rural areas,
without concomitantly providing additional housing opportunities.
Third, the region should be defined so as to simplify implemen-
tation of a plan of relief by the court. Although the differences
may be marginal, a larger region may require additional judicial
time in supervision, through hearings and supplemental orders.'" 8
In sum, the appropriate region is likely to be either a county or
multicounty area, perhaps coextensive with the SMSA or the
Housing Market Area. The choice will depend on the growth and
mobility patterns in the particular area, as well as the geographical
authority of the appropriate planning agency. Finally, the ur-
banized area may provide a useful definition in those unusual
situations in which significant portions of the SMSA are unlikely
to experience urbanization in the indefinite future, and, as a result,
there is little potential for movement to these parts of the SMSA.
4. Quantifying Regional Housing Needs-Once a court has
defined the relevant region, it must still quantify the remedial
116 See note 120 and accompanying text infra.
1 7 See text accompanying note I supra and notes 108- 15 supra.
118 See text accompanying note 134 infra.
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obligations of the individual municipalities within the region. The.
court must identify the number of low- and moderate-income
housing units each municipality will be required to accept. It will
be necessary to assess the need for low- and moderate-income
housing in the region as a whole. The overall requirements will
then be distributed among the municipalities. Regional needs
might be defined as the number of new housing units that would
be necessary to provide each low- and moderate-income family in
the region with a decent, standard housing unit within the financial
means of the family.11 9
This determination of housing needs is beyond the expertise of
the court and probably that of the parties as well. Thus, a court
must turn to an expert third party to perform this task. In most
instances a county, metropolitan, or regional planning agency
which has jurisdiction over the area which the court has defined
as the region will be in operation. Most of these agencies receive
federal funds from HUD under the Comprehensive Planning As-
sistance program to engage in comprehensive planning as well as
in specialized functional planning on an areawide basis.1 20 In
1968, Congress required the planning undertaken under this pro-
gram to include an assessment of housing needs. Section 601 of
the Housing and Urban Development Act of 1968 provided in
part that:
119 A study of the planner's role in housing clarifies the definition of needs:
It is also important to assess the need for lower income housing with some
specific and special considerations in mind. This can be illustrated by consid-
ering three major factors: I) the housing demand, 2) the housing need, and 3)
the housing supply. The terms are often used differently, or misused altogeth-
er. It is important to note that in a housing survey for lower income families,
there are more considerations than those for families that can compete in the
housing market. That is, there is a noneffective demand, the "social" need.
To ignore this component is to ignore a large problem of housing lower
income families.
This noneffective demand assumes that in assessing housing demand lower
income families have essentially a need for housing but do not necessarily
compete in market demand terms. This "social" need can be described in a
variety of ways and is characterized by a variety of phenomena. It is made up
primarily of families who are paying a disproportionate amount of their
income for housing (e.g., more than 20 percent), over and above those
families living in substandard or overcrowded housing units. Three
groups-the elderly, large families, and the lowest income families-have
been repeatedly identified as in greatest need of housing. Essentially it is a
category of lower income families who, for a variety of reasons, need housing
but may not create an economic market demand for it.
M. BROOKS, supra note 74, at 14. See also AMERICAN INSTITUTE OF PLANNERS & U.S.
DEPARTMENT OF HOUSING AND URBAN DEVELOPMENT, REGIONAL HOUSING PLANNING,
A TECHNICAL GUIDE (1972).
12040 U.S.C. § 461 (1970). This is usually referred to as the Section 701 program, after
the section of the statute creating it. Housing and Urban Development Act of 1968, § 601,
Pub. L. No. 90-448, 82 Stat. 526, amending Housing Act of 1954, ch. 649, § 701, 68 Stat.
640.
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Planning carried out with assistance under this section shall
also include a housing element as part of the preparation of
comprehensive land use plans, and this consideration of the
housing needs and land use requirements for housing in each
comprehensive plan shall take into account all available evi-
dence of the assumptions and statistical bases upon which the
projections of zoning, community facilities, and population
growth is based, so that the housing needs of both the region
and the local communities studied in the planning will be
adequately covered in terms of existing and prospective
in-migrant population growth. 121
In administering this housing element requirement, HUD has
included a requirement that the agency analyze the housing needs
within its jurisdiction:
The housing work program shall analyze the existing housing
market in terms of supply and demand by user group. The
work program shall further identify:
(1) Needs met by private market;
(2) Needs met with public assistance; and
(3) Needs not being met.122
The planning agency is a peculiarly appropriate institution to
which a court could turn for an analysis of housing needs, in light
of the preexisting requirements imposed on the planning agency
by the federal government. 123 In some cases housing needs will
have been measured recently, and the court can merely adopt the
findings of the planning agency. If there is no available planning
agency, or if it is otherwise appropriate, the court might require
the defendants to retain an expert acceptable to the plaintiffs,
presumably a planning consultant, to develop an analysis of the
regional need for low- and moderate-income housing.12 4 The court
may wish to provide some guidelines to the planners to insure that
the analysis is consistent with the rights of the plaintiffs.
In contrast to housing needs, the relevant income group-low-
and moderate-income families-could most easily be defined by
the court in terms of those who are eligible for existing federal
12140 U.S.C. § 461(a) (1970).
122U.s. DEPARTMENT OF HOUSING AND URBAN DEVELOPMENT, COMPREHENSIVE
PLANNING ASSISTANCE REQUIREMENTS AND GUIDELINES FOR A GRANT, HUD HAND-
BOOK I, CPM 6041.IA, ch. 4, § 5 (Mar., 1972).
123 The plaintiffs would presumably have included the planning agency among the named
defendants. The court could then order the agency to carry out any planning necessary to
develop the remedial framework.
124 In Shannon v. United States Dep't of Housing & Urban Dev. 436 F,2d 80) (3rd Cir.
1970), and Garrett v. City of Hamtramck, 335 F. Supp. 16 (E.D. Mich. 197 1), the courts
issued supplemental orders requiring an expert acceptable to the plaintiffs to be hired by
the defendant to assist in the development of a remedial plan.
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subsidized housing programs. Those definitions would thus vary
from one region to another. 125 A further issue for consideration by
the court is the time frame to be utilized. The court might
require that needs be projected for an appropriate future date or
that current housing needs be identified. 2 6 After considering
these factors the designated planner would submit to the court,
within a designated period, an analysis and conclusion of the
number of new housing units for low- and moderate-income fami-
lies needed in the region.
5. The Municipal Responsibility: A Proportionate Share of the
Region's Need- Simultaneously with an analysis of the regional
low- and moderate-income housing needs, court-designated plan-
ners should be ordered to develop a plan for distributing or
allocating the needed housing among the municipalities in the
region. Although the first regional housing allocation plan was
developed only as recently as 1970, this concept has become
widely accepted by the planning profession as well as by the
federal government. 127 Thus, a body of expertise has already been
125 See note 2 supra.
126 The purpose in projecting needs is to provide a realistic basis for planning programs
to meet the identified need. The implementation of programs may require a substantial
period of time after the analysis of needs is completed. To identify the appropriate period
for projection, the court may consider that the planning agency is undertaking a general
plan and other functional planning (e.g., water, sewer, and parks) and identify the time
period which permits maximum integration and coordination of various phases of the
planning for the metropolitan area or the region. On the other hand, the court might choose
to require that the needs analysis include a calculation of current housing needs. This
approach avoids the uncertainty implicit in making future projections.
Under either approach, the need for housing may be determined by calculating the
number of low- and moderate-income persons and families who are in need of housing and
the units meeting housing code standards which are available to this group. The difference
between these figures is the remaining need, the number of additional standard units
needed, in the appropriate price range, to house the group adequately.
127 A number of regional and county planning agencies have developed allocation plans
in the last three years. See MIAMI VALLEY REGIONAL PLANNING COMMISSION, A Hous-
ING PLAN FOR THE MIAMI VALLEY REGION (July, 1970); METROPOLITAN COUNCIL OF
THE TWIN CITIES AREA, INTERIM HOUSING ALLOCATION PROPOSAL (Staff Report Re-
lease, Dec. 15, 1971); METROPOLITAN WASHINGTON COUNCIL OF GOVERNMENTS, FAIR
SHARE HOUSING FORMULA (Jan., 1972); SAN BERNARDINO COUNTY PLANNING DEPART-
MENT, GOVERNMENT SUBSIDIZED HOUSING DISTRIBUTION MODEL FOR VALLEY PORTION
SAN BERNARDINO COUNTY, CALIFORNIA, (Jan. 20, 1972); SOUTHEASTERN WISCONSIN
REGIONAL PLANNING COMMISSION, A SHORT-RANGE ACTION HOUSING PROGRAM FOR
SOUTHEASTERN WISCONSIN- 1972 AND 1973 (July, 1972); SACRAMENTO, CALIFORNIA,
REGIONAL AREA PLANNING COMMISSION, AN APPROACH TO THE DISTRIBUTION OF Low
AND MODERATE-INCOME HOUSING, A TECHNICAL REPORT (Aug., 1972); DADE COUNTY,
FLORIDA, PLANNING DEPARTMENT, HOUSING IN THE METROPOLITAN PLAN (n.d.).
Other agencies which are in the process of developing some form of regional allocation
plan include the Delaware Valley Regional Planning Commission in the Philadelphia area;
the East-West Gateway Coordinating Council in St. Louis, Missouri; the Mid-America
Regional Council in Kansas City, Missouri; the Regional Planning Council in Baltimore,
Maryland; the Southeast Michigan Council of Governments in Detroit, Michigan; the
Puget Sound Governmental Conference in Seattle, Washington; and the Metropolitan
Area Planning Council in Boston, Massachusetts.
In addition, the national organizations of professional planners have indicated strong
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built up, enabling a planning agency to develop a plan for pur-
poses of court-ordered implementation. In addition planning
agencies will be in a position to fashion a plan because those
planning agencies which receive HUD funds are presently re-
quired to implement activities in this area. This assistance-related
mandate required affected planning agencies to "define strategies
and specific steps by which housing needs, and its [sic] related
public services and facilities, can be met through responsive gov-
ernmental programs and private action."' 128
As with an analysis of housing needs, the court would need to
provide a framework to guide the planners, such as a definition of
the region which the distribution plan was to cover and a desig-
nation of the municipalities constituting subareas to which alloca-
tions of housing units will be made. In addition, the court might
identify the criteria to be used in allocating the needed housing.129
support for low- and moderate-income housing allocation plans. See Hearings on H.R.
9688 Before the Subcommittee on Housing of the Committee on Banking and Currency,
92d Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 2, at 674 (1971). (remarks of Mr. Davidoff); M. BROOKS, supra
note 74, at 3; letter from Howard A. Glickstein, Staff Director, U.S. Civil Rights Commis-
sion, to Secretary of HUD George Romney, July 26, 1971.
Finally, HUD has encouraged, rewarded, indeed insisted upon, the development of
so-called "fair share" plans for allocating low- and moderate-income housing throughout
metropolitan areas. See Secretary of HUD George Romney, October 27. 1971, quoted in
METROPOLITAN WASHINGTON COUNCIL OF GOVERNMENTS, FAIR SHARE HOUSING FOR-
MULA ii (Jan., 1972); Remarks prepared for delivery by Deputy Secretary Richard C. Van
Dusen. issued by HUD NEWS for release on Feb. 29, 1972, at 16- 17.
In one instance HUD insisted upon the presentation of a fair share plan as a condition
of making planning funds available. On March 31, 1971, HUD withdrew its support of a
housing study being conducted by the Southeastern Wisconsin Regional Planning Commis-
sion (SEWRPC) for Milwaukee and six surrounding counties. HUD said its primary
concern with the SEWRPC housing program was its lack of a "short term action plan or
strategy," and offered "an example of what might be done to meet that need." The
example was a fair share plan for the seven-county region. Letter from Edward M. Levin,
Jr., Acting Assistant Regional Adminstrator for Metropolitan Planning and Development,
Chicago Regional Office of HUD, to George C. Berteau, Chairman, Southeastern Wiscon-
sin Regional Planning Commission, Mar. 3 1, 1971.
The first allocation plan in the country, and the farthest along in implementation, is the
"Dayton Plan." For a detailed discussion of the development and implementation of the
Dayton Plan, see Bertsch & Shafor, A Regional Housing Plan: The Miami Valley
Regional Planning Commission Experience, PLANNERS NOTEBOOK, April, 1971, at 1-8;
Craig, The Dayton Area's "Fair Share" Housing Plan Enters the Implementation Phase,
CITY, Jan.- Feb., 1972, at 50-56; National Committee Against Discrimination in Housing,
Fair Share Idea Begins to Spread, TRENDS IN HOUSING, July-Aug., 1972.
12 See note 122 supra.
129 One study has suggested that the criteria can be categorized in terms of (T) the need
for low- and moderate-income housing in the particular community; (2) distribution: and
(3) suitability of the area.
Local need criteria which have been used in various distribution plans include a
consideration of the low- and moderate-income population of the municipality; the number
of substandard or overcrowded housing units within its borders; the number of commuters
into the community or the number of jobs located there.
Distributive criteria attempt to insure that the supply of housing in each community is
balanced between low- and moderate-income housing and other kinds of housing. In its
simplest form, such a criterion would allocate an equal share to each community or a
proportion equal to its share of the regional number of households.
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The criteria for distributing the needed housing should focus on
land, for access to land is the basic issue in exclusionary zoning
litigation. Thus, the numerical obligation of each community
should depend in part on the amount of vacant land which is
capable of being developed in the community.
Other factors should also be considered. The allocation of
required housing might also be designed, for example, to max-
imize the plaintiffs' employment and educational opportunities,
which have been diminished by the exclusionary practices. 130
Such a plan should be equitable for all parties, providing realistic
access for low- and moderate-income families while fairly dis-
tributing the costs involved among the relevant communities.' 3 '
To accomplish this latter purpose, criteria such as population and
fiscal capacity might be included in the distribution formula. In
addition, the court should give weight to the previous good faith
efforts of a community to deal with the region's low- and moder-
ate-income housing problem. If a community has taken some
steps to open its gates, its judicially-imposed responsibility should
be reduced accordingly. The obligation should be decreased by
the number of standard low- and moderate-income housing units
already existing in the community. This will prevent a community
from bearing a disproportionate share of the remedial respon-
sibility.' 32
Planning agencies which have developed criteria and collected
Suitability criteria look to the ability of the community to absorb additional low- and
moderate-income housing. Under these criteria, units have been allocated on the basis of
the amount of vacant land, the availability of water and sewer and other facilities, the
assessed valuation per pupil in the local schools, and the public school capacities related to
current number of students. These criteria attempt to measure current and potential
capacity of each community to support low- and moderate-income housing. M. BROOKS,
supra note 74, at 20-21, 37-38.
130 For extensive discussions of these issues, see, e.g., NATIONAL COMMITTEE AGAINST
DISCRIMINATION IN HOUSING, THE IMPACT OF HOUSING PATTERNS ON JOB OPPORTU-
NITIES (1968); Downs, Alternative Futures for the American Ghetto, 97 DAEDALUS 1331
(1968); Downs, Residential Segregation: Its Effects on Education, 36 EDUCATION DIGEST
12 (1971); NATIONAL COMMITTEE AGAINST DISCRIMINATION IN HOUSING, JOBS AND
HOUSING: A Two YEAR STUDY OF EMPLOYMENT AND HOUSING OPPORTUNITIES FOR
RACIAL MINORITIES IN SUBURBAN AREAS OF THE NEW YORK METROPOLITAN REGION
(1972); Kristensen, Levy, & Savir, The Suburban Lock-Out Effect, SUBURBAN ACTION
INSTITUTE, RESEARCH REPORT # 1, (1971); Davidoff, Davidoff, & Gold, Suburban Ac-
tion:Advocate Planning for an Open Society, 1970 J. AM. INSTITUTE OF PLANNERS 12;
Davidoff, Davidoff, & Gold, The Suburbs Have to Open Their Gates, N.Y. Times, Nov.
7, 1971, (Magazine), at 40.
131 See National Association of Regional Councils, Summary: Special Preview of Re-
gional Council Housing Programs, HOUSING REPORTER, Sept., 1972, at 5-6; M. BROOKS,
supra note 74, at 17-21.
132 One approach which has been suggested is a "population percentage" standard:
A community would be relieved of its duty to zone more land in high density
categories suitable for the use of low- and moderate-income housing if its
indigent population bore approximately the same percentage relationship to
the entire metropolitan area's indigent population as the community's total
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relevant data have found that many of the potential criteria mea-
sure the same factors. It is possible, therefore, to establish a small
number of relatively simple criteria and arrive at an equitable
distribution of low- and moderate-income housing. These criteria
might include: (1) amount of vacant, developable land; (2) number
of relevant jobs; (3) degree of underutilization of classrooms; (4)
population; and (5) assessed valuation per pupil, as a measure of
the municipality's fiscal capacity. These criteria, or others like
them, could be established by the court. In the alternative, the
court might defer to the planners to select the criteria which are
appropriate in light of the character of the region. 133
6. Implementation of the Plan-Under the allocation plan, the
parties would be able to know with relative simplicity when a
given municipality had met the legal obligation of supplying hous-
ing as ordered by the court. Until the required number of housing
units for low- and moderate-income families was provided, the
community would be required to permit further development. To
facilitate construction according to the plan, an appropriate decree
would include implementation provisions. 34 Because the court
population bore to the metropolitan area's total. Essentially, this test would
require each community to assume the burden of providing for its "share" of
the poor in the metropolitan area, at least in terms of its zoning plans.
Note, The Responsibility of Local Zoning Authorities to Nonresident Indigents, 23 STAN.
L. REV. 774, 793 (1971) (footnote omitted).
This approach, however, ignores the basic legal question of access to land. It also runs
into practical problems, such as land shortages and unavailability of jobs. For discussions
of alternative approaches, see Marcus, Exclusionary Zoning: The Need for a Regional
Planning Context, 16 N.Y.L.F. 732 (1970); Comment, Regional Impact of Zoning: A
Suggested Approach, 114 U. PA. L. REV. 1251 (1966); Note, The Equal Protection
Clause and Exclusionary Zoning After Valtierra and Dandridge, 81 YALE L.J. 61 (197 I).
133 Criteria vary among plans. For a small region or one in which the job opportunities
are concentrated and not moving, such as the Dayton, Ohio area, the location of jobs may
not be a significant factor. In a large region, characterized by suburbanization of jobs and
long, expensive reverse commuting, job location may be a critical factor. Each areawide
planning agency which has developed an allocation plan has established its own criteria,
based on local conditions and considerations.
134 Several exclusionary zoning cases are currently pending which assert the need for
affirmative relief, involving planning (on a citywide or regional basis) and implementation
vehicles in the requested decree. See, e.g., Bayliss v. Borough of Franklin Lakes, No.
L-339 10-71 T.W. (N.J. Sup. Ct., Bergen County, filed Aug. 3, 1972); Cornwall Estates v.
Town of Cornwall, Civil No. 72-3291 (S.D.N.Y., filed Aug. 2, 1972); Planning for People
Coalition v. County of DuPage, Civil No. 71-C587 (N.D. Ill., filed Sept. 14, 1971); Fair
Housing Dev. Fund Corp. v. Burke, Civil No. 71-C328 (E.D.N.Y., filed July 18, 1972);
Accion Hispana, Inc. v. Town of New Canaan, Civil No. B312 (D. Conn., filed June 14,
1971).
This kind of case raises many questions, a number of which are procedural in nature and
must be resolved favorably for the plaintiffs before the question of remedy is even
addressed. Future residents of subsidized housing projects have been held to have standing
in cases involving government officials' impeding construction of such units. See James v.
Valtierra, 402 Y.S. 137 (1971); Gautreaux v. Chicago Housing Authority, 296 F. Supp.
907 (N.D. III. 1969), affd, 436 F.2d 306 (7th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 953
(1972); Crow v. Brown, 332 F. Supp. 382 (N.D. Ga. 1971), affid, 457 F.2d 788 (5th Cir.
1972); Kennedy Park Homes Ass'n v. City of Lackawanna, 436 F.2d 108 (2nd Cir. 1970),
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will retain jurisdiction over the case, it should state the limited
purposes for which it would continue to intervene in the devel-
opment process. Included in this should be an outline of the type
of action the court would take.
a. Criteria for Selecting a Plan of Implementation - In setting
out when, why, and how it will supervise implementation of the
plan after the initial order is issued, the court might consider the
need to balance several potentially conflicting objectives. First,
any approach adopted must be judicially manageable: it should be
within the competence of the court to administer. The court
should not be confronted with constant, lengthy hearings and the
resultant need to issue numerous, complex supplemental orders.
Second, the remedial scheme should maximize efficiency in devel-
oping low- and moderate-income housing. It should emphasize
providing relief to the plaintiffs as rapidly as possible. Unneces-
sary delay itself is an additional hardship for the litigants. It also
imposes costs on developers, including increased interest on
loans, payments for options, and rising costs of materials and
labor. The developer may not be able to build the project at all if
delays are so great that it becomes financially infeasible. Finally,
the court's approach should seek to maximize retention of local
control of the planning process and should insure that valid local
considerations, such as those clearly related to health and safety,
would be attended to.
b. The Set-Aside-Several alternatives are available to the
courts for implementing the allocation plan. Some have been
presented to the courts in the form of requested relief in recently
filed cases. Each should be evaluated in terms of the criteria set
cert. denied, 401 U.S. 1010 (1971): Dailey v. City of Lawton. 425 F.2d 1037 (10th Cir.
1970); Southern Alameda Spanish Speaking Organization (SASSO) v. City of Union City,
424 F.2d 291 (9th Cir. 1970); Hicks v. Weaver, 302 F. Supp. 619 (E.D. La. 1969).
Standing was found in these cases because the denial of housing opportunities violated the
constitutional rights of potential residents who were within the zone of interests protected
by the statutes involved.
For a discussion of a broadened concept of standing in the exclusionary zoning context,
see, e.g., George, Standing to Challenge Exclusionary Local Zoning Decisions: Restricted
Access to State Courts and the Alternative Federal Forum, 22 SYRACUSE L. REV. 598
(197 1); Note, The Responsibility of Local Zoning Authorities to Nonresident Indigents,
23 STAN. L. REV. 774 (1971); Note, Extending Standing to Non-Residents-A Response
to the Exclusionary Effects of Zoning Fragmentation, 24 VAND. L. REV. 341 (1971);
Hendel, The "Aggrieved Person" Requirement in Zoning, 8 WM. & MARY L. REV. 294
(1967); Comment, Standing to Appeal Zoning Determinations: The 'Aggrieved Person'
Requirement, 64 MICH. L. REV. 1070 (1966).
On the related issues of exhaustion of administrative remedies and ripeness and justicia-
bility in the exclusionary zoning context, see Park View Heights Corp. v. City of Black
Jack, 467 F.2d 1208 (8th Cir. 1972). See also Southern Burlington County NAACP v.
Township of Mount Laruel, 199 N.J. Super, 164, 290 A.2d 465 (1972); Note, Exhaustion
of Remedies in Zoning Cases, 1968 WASH. U.L.Q. 368; 3 R. ANDERSON, AMERICAN LAW
OF ZONING § 22 (1968); 3 K. DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE § 20 (1968).
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forth above. First, the set-aside principle discussed above in rela-
tion to providing relief on a single site could be applied in the
regional context. Any developer of subsidized housing whose
project was consistent with the court-ordered allocation plan and
who was denied a rezoning or any of the other necessary local
approvals could request the court to set aside the local require-
ments as frustrating constitutionally required relief. Presumably,
the developer would be able to secure the approvals in most
instances, and relatively few projects would require judicial in-
tervention. The court would step in only after a developer had
made a good faith effort to obtain the local approvals.
A hearing would be held which would be limited to establishing
that the developer had made a good faith effort to secure neces-
sary approvals, the locality had denied the approvals, and the
denial frustrates effective relief for the plaintiffs. The reasons for
the denial and the merits of those reasons would not be at issue,
for the set-aside principle provides for the court-ordered bypass
of local regulations if they frustrate constitutionally required re-
lief, even if they are otherwise valid. The supplemental order in
this situation would enjoin the community from impeding the
building of the development in any way, thus permitting the devel-
oper to commence construction of the particular project without
securing further local approvals.
In addition to limiting the amount of court participation, the
set-aside technique as applied here would facilitate rapid devel-
opment of housing. The developer would proceed through the
local administrative process in the same way as any other residen-
tial developer. If his original or revised plans were approved, he
could proceed to build his project. If not, a single, short judicial
procedure would be initiated, resulting in court permission to
build.
The municipal interest in health, safety, and other valid local
concerns could be protected in several ways within the set-aside
framework. First, if the project were subsidized by HUD, it
would be required to meet federal standards for construction and
environmental quality, including the availability of supportive ser-
vices and facilities. Second, the developer here has the same
incentives to build projects which are sound as in the single-site
context.13 5 Finally, the court might order municipalities which
have received subsidized housing to make periodic reports, per-
haps on an annual basis, of their progress and their problems.
These reports would point out any hardships the set-aside has
135 See notes 73-90 and accompanying text supra.
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caused them, which might lead the court to impose additional
requirements on developers seeking similar orders. Although
these protections do not assure that every subsidized housing
project will comply literally with the maze of local administrative
regulations, substantial deviations should be minimal under this
process.
c. Override-A similar remedial vehicle available to the court
is the "override." The court could grant to developers of low- and
moderate-income housing a generalized authority to override local
zoning and other codes, after having made good faith efforts to
comply with these requirements and having had their applications
to the appropriate authorities rejected. This approach would in
essence permit the court to follow the model of the legislatively
created State of New York Urban Development Corporation
(NYUDC). This agency is authorized to plan, fund, and develop
low- and moderate-income housing projects.' 3 6 The Corporation
has the power to ignore local laws, ordinances, zoning codes, and
building regulations when, in its discretion, compliance is not
feasible or practicable. Before doing so, NYUDC must work
closely with elected officials and community leaders to achieve
local and regional goals.
In following an NYUDC model the court would identify those
developers to whom it would grant the authority to override local
regulations. It might include all developers of publicly subsidized
housing, or a subgroup such as state housing agencies (where such
agencies exist). 3 7 These developers would be required to seek
local approvals and would be entitled to ignore local ordinances
only after efforts to obtain these approvals failed. The override
would continue in effect until the locality's remedial obligation
was fulfilled.
One of the primary advantages of the override technique is that
it minimizes continuing judicial intervention. Once the court des-
ignates recipients of this authority, the court would not play a role
in individual projects but would merely monitor regional progress
on a periodic basis. Developers who are granted this
authority might be given a mandate at the outset to use their best
efforts to expand the housing supply as rapidly as possible. If the
developer does not proceed on this basis, the court might issue
136 New York Urban Development Corporation Act, N.Y. UNCONSOL. LAWS § 6251 et
seq. (McKinney Supp. 1972).
137 Approximately twenty-two states have created housing finance agencies. This group
includes many of the urbanized states. For a discussion of their operation, see Alexander,
Fifteen State Housing Finance Agencies in Review, J. HOUSING, Jan., 1972, at 9; EARL
WARREN LEGAL INSTITUTE, LAW PROJECT BULLETIN, Oct. 15, 1972, at 9; EARL WARREN
LEGAL INSTITUTE, LAW PROJECT BULLETIN, Apr. 15, 1972, at 5; AMERICAN INSTITUTE
OF PLANNERS, AlP NEWSLETTER, Oct., 1971, at 8.
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more specific supplemental orders or designate additional or al-
ternative grantees of the override authority. Additionally, housing
would probably be built rapidly under an override system. In-
dividual projects would not require advance judicial approval.
Thus, most projects would move through the local administrative
process at a reasonable pace.
d. Mixed Income Developments-A third implementation ve-
hicle would be a court-ordered requirement that developers build-
ing any housing in the relevant municipalities include a specified
percentage of low- and moderate-income housing units within
their project. Just as the override technique has a statutory analo-
gy in the New York State Urban Development Corporation Act,
this mandate for developers is based on an ordinance enacted by
the County Council of Fairfax County, Virginia. The Fairfax
County ordinance, passed in August, 1971, requires that for any
residential development of fifty or more units:
An applicant for RPC (Residential Planned Community) zon-
ing or for an amended development thereunder... shall pro-
vide or cause others to provide, under the development plan,
low-income units which shall not be less (and may be more)
than six percent (6%) of the total number of units (other than
detached single family dwelling units) specified in the devel-
opment plan. The applicant shall also provide, or cause others
to provide, the number of moderate-income dwelling units
which, when added to the number of low-income dwelling
units, shall not be less (and may be more) than fifteen percent
(15%) of the total number of dwelling units (other than de-
tached single family dwelling units) specified in the devel-
opment plan. 138
Under the Fairfax ordinance the county executive is authorized
to withhold approvals for a development until the applicant com-
plies with these requirements. If government subsidies are not
available, the developer is excused, but he must satisfy the county
executive that he is making persistent good faith efforts to obtain
the proposed subsidies and provide such dwelling units.139
Transposing this device to the remedial context, the court
138 Fairfax County Code, Fairfax County, Va., Zoning Amendment # 156, Aug., 1971.
The ordinance covers planned unit developments, planned communities, planned apart-
ment developments, multifamily districts (except high rises) and townhouse zones. The
ordinance was challenged in the state courts, in DeGroff Enterprises Inc. v. Board of
County Supervisors, Law No. 25609 (Fairfax County Civ. Ct., Nov. 1I, 1971). The trial
court held that the ordinance excluded the powers which the State Zoning Enabling Act
delegated to the County Board. The County petitioned for an appeal to the Virginia
Supreme Court of Appeals. M. Romansky, Fairfax County Zoning Amendment # 156, at
6, 14 (unpublished report on file at Center for Urban Affairs, Northwestern University).
139 The applicant's efforts are to be judged according to the normal processing time and
procedures required to obtain the various subsidies.
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might enjoin the municipalities from granting zoning or other
approvals to residential developments unless the projects will
contain a specified percentage of low- and moderate-income hous-
ing units. In a pending case, Planning for People Coalition v.
County of DuPage,140 the plaintiffs seek such relief, requesting
that DuPage County be enjoined from giving any zoning approval
for new residential developments for the relatively wealthy with-
out simultaneously making adequate provisions for housing for
persons with low and moderate incomes.
This approach assumes, of course, a potential for unsubsidized
residential development or redevelopment in the subject munici-
palities. Furthermore, the suburban communities involved will
usually have a supply of vacant land and will be experiencing
growth and in-migration.
Unless municipalities attempted to exclude all residential devel-
opments, the court's continuing role could be limited to periodic
monitoring of the progress of development. If any community did
become intransigent and attempted to block all residential devel-
opments, the developer of an economically integrated project
could seek a set-aside order, after making good faith efforts to
secure the necessary local approvals. From the plaintiff's stand-
point, providing developers with this additional incentive to build
low- and moderate-income housing may accelerate the provision
of such housing. A final advantage inherent in this technique is
that local control of planning and zoning would remain largely
intact. The community would continue to decide which areas
should be residential, industrial, and commercial. This was the
original task of zoning as articulated by the United States Su-
preme Court in Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co.141
e. Miscellaneous-To insure that relief is comprehensive and
effective, the court might include other provisions in its decree, in
combination with one or more of the techniques discussed above.
On the basis of its finding that certain zoning practices are ex-
clusionary and thus invalid, it could enjoin any municipality from
enforcing or relying on such practices in conjunction with any
rezoning, variance, building permit, or other local approval which
is necessary for the development of subsidized housing units. 142
The court could also specify a period of time before the set-aside
or other provisions of the order would become effective, during
which individual municipalities could rezone enough appropriate
140 Civil No. 71-C587 (N.D. Ill., filed Sept. 14, 1971).
141 272 U.S. 365, 396-97 (1926).
142 Bayliss v. Borough of Franklin Lakes, Docket No. L-33910-71 T.W. (N.J. Sup. Ct.,
Bergen County, filed Aug. 3, 1972).
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land for low- and moderate-income housing to meet their obliga-
tions under the allocation plan. This would provide additional
protection for the municipalities' planning and zoning pre-
rogatives. Furthermore, it would keep the court from becoming
involved in the selection of individual sites for low- and moder-
ate-income housing.
As in the case involving a specific project, the court would
order the individual municipalities to grant any approvals neces-
sary for the utilization of federal subsidy programs. Finally, in the
regional context, there may be one or more local housing au-
thorities with jurisdiction in suburban areas. These agencies could
assist in providing relief by developing low-rent public housing as
rapidly as possible, in accordance with the allocation plan. In
order to achieve maximum relief for plaintiffs, they should be
ordered to do so.143
143 See Gautreaux v. Chicago Housing Authority. 304 F. Supp. 736 (N.D. III. 1969).
In several pending cases, plaintiffs seek variations of the relief discussed in this section.
Accion Hispana Inc. v. Town of New Canaan, Civil No. B3 12, (D. Conn.. filed June 14,
1971) involves a challenge to the zoning scheme of an affluent suburb of New York City.
The complaint attacks a whole range of land-use practices, including two- and four-acre
minimum lot-sizes, extreme limitations on multifamily housing and prohibition of mobile
homes. The broad relief requested includes invalidating the existing land-use laws and
ordering enactment of new laws which would include:
(I) The reservation of not less than five sites of vacant, developable land to
be used solely for the development of single and/or multifamily housing units
for persons of low and moderate income, such sites to be:
(a) Zoned for a density approximately equal to the average density of
middle and upper-income multi-family housing now in New Canaan;
(b) Of sufficient distance from one another so as to avoid ghettoization
and provide prospective residents with a diversity of choice of surround-
ings similar to that enjoyed by existing white middle and upper-income
residents of the town: and
(c) Of sufficient land area so that, when developed as aforesaid, the
proportion that New Canaan's minority residents bears to New Canaan's
population as a whole will be approximately equal to such proportion in
the State, region or nation, as the Court deems most appropriate;
(2) Diversified sites throughout the Town for the development of significant
numbers of housing units other than single-family detached dwellings;
(3) Land for housing sufficient to meet the needs of all employees of
business, industry and public service which enter New Canaan subsequent to
the commencement of this suit;
(4) The utilization of mobile homes as dwellings: and
(5) The utilization of new and more economical construction techniques
including, but not limited to, modular and pre-fabricated housing units.
Id. Plaintiffs Complaint, at 28- 29.
The defendant town would be given forty-five days to submit such a new law for the
court's approval. In the interim, the town would not be permitted to grant rezonings, or
issue any building permits or certificates of occupancy. The town would be required to
vote the necessary approval so that developers could make use of the federal rent
supplement program. The court -fould retain jurisdiction, and the town would submit
quarterly reports to the court on the developmental status of the low- and moder-
ate-income housing sites.
In Cornwall Estates Co. v. Town of Cornwall, Civil No. 72-3291 (S.D.N.Y.. filed Aug.
2, 1972), the plaintiffs include ten low- and moderate-income black individuals from
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VI. CONCLUSION
As in the school segregation and housing segregation cases,
providing relief for those excluded by suburban zoning practices
will be a stiff test of judicial ingenuity and stamina. In seeking to
vindicate the constitutional rights of low- and moderate-income
families, courts alone cannot guarantee that the necessary housing
will actually be built. Subsidy funds must be appropriated by
Congress. Developers interested in building subsidized housing
will also be needed.
In spite of the fact that parts of the process may be beyond the
control of the courts, the courts' responsibility is to take all
possible steps to provide real remedies for those whose con-
stitutional rights have been abridged. The courts cannot hold
zoning practices discriminatory and then declare that they can do
nothing to provide a remedy. They must take the initiative to
develop affirmative relief which removes the exclusionary subur-
ban barriers and insures that alternative exclusionary tactics do
not prevent complete relief.
Suits will continue to be brought under the single-site approach,
concerning specific housing developments. Some of these will
have major implications, in terms of increasing suburban housing
opportunities for low- and moderate-income families. 14 4 In these
neighboring Newburgh, New "York, who are potential consumers of low- and moder-
ate-income housing in Cornwall, suing on behalf of all minority and lower income persons
who are excluded from residence in Cornwall. Also a plaintiff is Cornwall Estates Com-
pany, which had tried unsuccessfully for more than six years to build townhouse apart-
ments in Cornwall for persons of moderate income. Cornwall Estates alleges that the town
and various of its officials have thwarted its efforts to develop housing on a site which it
owns because it proposed to build units with three or more bedrooms, thus bringing school
children into the community.
. In their request for relief, plaintiffs ask that Cornwall be required to rezone substantial
portions of its land for low- and moderate-income housing, to take all steps necessary to
permit the development of federally subsidized housing, and to permit the Cornwall
Estates project to proceed. Id. Plaintiffs Complaint at 36- 39. Cornwall Estates is pledged
to construct federally subsidized housing on its site.
In the Fair Housing Dev. Fund Corp. v. Burke, Civil No. 71-328 (E.D.N.Y. filed July
18, 1972), the plaintiffs have charged that the zoning ordinances of the Town of Oyster
Bay, Long Island, New York, exclude low-income families. In addition to seeking to have
the ordinance declared unconstitutional, the plaintiffs have requested the court to order the
town to prepare and implement a plan to accommodate the housing needs of low-income
families, both residents and non-residents of the town. This would be a:
comprehensive plan which will eliminate the racially impacted residential
enclaves within the Town and which will provide for and assure land-use
opportunities for the construction of low and moderate income dwelling units
within the Town to meet the needs of the Plaintiffs and the members of the
class they represent, and will end existing racial segregation in housing
therein.
Id. Plaintiff's Complaint, at 19. See generally Shields & Spector, Opening Up the Suburbs:
Notes on a Movement for Social Change, 2 YALE REv. L. & SOCIAL ACTION 300 (1972).
144 An illustration of the potential under the single site strategy is the approach of the
Garden Cities Development Corporation of New Jersey. Garden Cities is a nonprofit
SPRING 1973] Exclusionary Zoning Remedies
cases courts must insure that the site is preserved for low- and
moderate-income housing and that the locality's intransigence
does not impede construction of the housing.
Regional remedies must also be employed. The courts in-
creasingly are asserting that housing and zoning are regional ques-
tions, which require multijurisdictional solutions. Individual com-
munities cannot be permitted to ignore this problem, nor can the
measure of their responsibility be assessed without a regional
analysis and plan. The court's role is not to engage in areawide
planning but to require that planning bodies do so.
The mere adoption of such an allocation plan is not sufficient to
satisfy the court's duty. It must take the necessary steps to see to
it that the plan becomes a reality. In employing these vehicles in
the conduct of a regional plan, the courts will reduce the amount
of litigation needed, avoiding a project-by-project, city-by-city
approach. A framework will be established, which minimizes the
necessity for continual judicial intervention and maintains max-
imum local control of the zoning and planning process. At the
same time, the courts will meet their responsibility by insuring
that real housing opportunities for low- and moderate-income
families are created in suburban areas.
housing developer affiliated with Suburban Action Institute, a nonprofit organization
whose purpose is to gain access to the suburbs for low- and moderate-income families.
Garden Cities entered into a conditional sales contract to purchase a large piece of land
in Mahwah, New Jersey. The sale is conditional on Garden Cities' obtaining a zoning
amendment. Mahwah is an affluent community, with low density zoning. The Garden
Cities site was previously zoned single-family residential, with a minimum lot-size of two
acres.
In its application to the Township Committee of Mahwah and the Planning Board
requesting a zoning amendment, Garden Cities indicated its desire to develop a community
of 6,000 townhouse and garden apartment units on 720 acres of land in Mahwah. The
proposed amendment would enable Garden Cities to construct garden apartments and
townhouses at a gross density of nine units per acre, and the limitation on the number of
bedrooms would be removed. In addition the amendment would allow some limited
three-story residences and commercial development. Overall, however, only 20 percent of
the subject land is to be covered with structures.
The development planned by Garden Cities would accommodate almost 19,000 people
with annual incomes between $5,000 and $20,000. Current population of the 25.7 square
mile town is under 11,000. Forty percent of the dwelling units were to be subsidized. This
would permit many of the 6,000 employees of Mahwah's Ford plant as well as those of the
town's Western Union, ABEX, and other corporate facilities to live in the community.
Previously, only a few of these employees were able to live in Mahwah, with the remain-
der commuting from as far away as the ghettoes of New York City, one to two hours
away.
The application for the zoning amendment was submitted on September 6, 1972. The
public hearing on the Garden Cities proposal was held on December II, 1972. If the plan
is rejected by the town, it is likely that Garden Cities would seek judicial reversal of that
decision. A favorable determination by the courts could lead directly to implementation of
the plan and development of an economically and racially integrated community of several
thousand families. See Garden Cities Development Corporation, Application for Zoning
Amendment to the Township Committee of the Township of Mahwah, New Jersey, Sept.
6, 1972.
